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CONTENTS

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USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Karpov: 'Rapid Breakthrough Possible' in Geneva AA 1
[IZVESTIYA 31 Oct]
U.S. Geneva Orders Counter Reykjavik Agreements AA 3
[Kozyakov]
Ponomarev Comments on U.S. Policy 'Zig-Zags' AA 4
Bogachev Scores U.S. Nuclear Test Ban Stance AA 5
Chernyshev Attacks U.S. Arguments for SDI AA 6
[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Oct]
PRAVDA Roundtable on Prospects for Arms Curbs AA 8
[Tokarski, Mohan, Suzuki, Karnowski, Jackson, Zhukov, Ovchinnikov, Grigoryev]
Anthology of Reykjavik Summit Documents Published AA 18
[PRAVDA 29 Oct]

WORLD & REGIONAL ISSUES

Gerashimov Views Various Issues at Press Briefing CC 1
Observance of Human Rights Day CC 1
Vienna CSCE Meeting [AFP] CC 1
FRG Stance on Nazi Crimes CC 1
Laser Development CC 2
UN Urges Israel To Surrender Nuclear 'Units' CC 3

NORTHEAST ASIA

Murakhovskiy Departs Mongolia for Home C 1
[PRAVDA 26 Oct]
PRAVDA on Return From Mongolia [27 Oct] C 1
Unified U.S.-Japan Command in Okinawa Announced C 1

SOUTHEAST ASIA & PACIFIC

Phoumi Vongvichit Named Acting President of Laos E 1
Soviet Amity Society Chairman Greets Sim Ka [Phnom Penh] E 1
Thai Aircraft 'Intrude' Cambodian Airspace E 1
NEW TIMES Cites PRK's Hun Sen on Asian Security [No 42, 27 Oct] E 1

EASTERN EUROPE

Kadar Interviewed in NEW TIMES on Progress [No 41, 20 Oct] F 1
TASS Cites Disarmament Message by BCP's Zhivkov F 7
Bulgarian Paper Interviews PRAVDA's Afanasyev F 8
[Radev, Angelov in Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO 24 Oct]
Bulgarian Officials Meet With PRAVDA's Afanasyev F 14
[Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO 24 Oct]

Korcak-Led Delegation Visits Kirgiz SSR F 14
Received by CP Officials [Bratislava PRAVDA 22 Oct] F 14
Departs From Frunze [Prague] F 14
Comments on 'Problems' [Bratislava PRAVDA 27 Oct] F 15
GDR's Stoph, Finland's Pystynen Urge Weapon Cuts F 15
Nuclear Plant Agreement Signed With GDR F 15
Sokolov Greets Romanian Counterpart Milea F 16
[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 25 Oct]
Murakhovskiy Receives Romanian Minister F 16
Demichev Receives Hungary's Pozsgay 29 Oct [MTI] F 16

LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN

Ministry Spokesman Condemns UK Falklands Decision K 1
Pentagon, CIA Plan Training for 'Somocistas' K 1
[Turkatenko]

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

POLITICAL & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

12 Estonians Drafted for Chernobyl Cleanup 'Shot' [AFP] R 1
Further Report [Stockholm] R 1
NOVOSTI Chief Interviewed on Domestic Reforms R 2
[Vienna KURIER 30 Oct]
Moldavian CP Plenum Dismisses Officials R 5
[SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA 23 Oct]
Latvian CP Investigates River Bridge Accident R 6
Government Outlines Plan for 1986-90 Legislation R 7
[VEDOMISTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SOYUZA SOVETSKIKH SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH RESPUBLIK No 37, 10 Sep]
Article Cites Infant Mortality Figures R 14
[EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA No 43, Oct]

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

Changes in Foreign Trade Methods Discussed S 1
[Shastiko in EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA Oct]

KARPOV: 'RAPID BREAKTHROUGH POSSIBLE' IN GENEVA

PM301632 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with USSR Foreign Ministry directorate chief V.P. Karpov by A. Shalnev: "V. Karpov: Solid Foundations Have Been Laid" -- date, place of interview not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] "A rapid, profound breakthrough at the Geneva talks is possible. But, for this, it is necessary to build on the foundations which were laid at the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik, and to build on those foundations, not to revise them," says V.P. Karpov, chief of a USSR Foreign Ministry directorate and head of the Soviet delegation at the talks on nuclear and space arms.

In an interview with IZVESTIYA, V.P. Karpov said:

"What was achieved in Reykjavik -- namely, agreement on the need to eliminate over 10 years all, and I emphasize all, the strategic offensive arms of the United States and the Soviet Union; an accord on the total elimination of American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe; an accord, almost agreed on, concerning the commencement of full-scale talks on ending nuclear explosions -- all this, of course, requires a new approach to the Geneva talks. It is necessary to take a new look at the nature of the discussions, at how much emphasis to place where, and where to focus attention. Unfortunately, we cannot yet say these talks are proceeding in a new way, that they reflect the degree of understanding achieved at the highest level in Reykjavik."

[Shalnev] What do you see as the reason for this?

[Karpov] In the United States, not everyone is pleased with the Reykjavik results. An intensive struggle is under way behind the scenes, the visible results of which are the attempts to modify the content and course of the Reykjavik meeting and what was achieved there. In Geneva, one can clearly perceive on the American side a desire to wrap old proposals in, so to speak, "Reykjavik packaging" and to prevent the talks from emerging from the impasse into which Washington drove them with its position, which basically does not provide for the resolution of the cardinal problems of nuclear disarmament.

[Shalnev] The LOS ANGELES TIMES newspaper reports that according to their instructions the American delegation in Geneva will adhere to a "more gradual approach" -- that is, they will simply delay the talks. THE WASHINGTON POST is more specific: According to its information, the U.S. delegation will try to focus attention mainly on the issue of eliminating nuclear ballistic missiles, thereby revising the consensus reached in Reykjavik, and in effect setting aside the other two components of the strategic triad -- heavy bombers with cruise missiles, and sea-launched ballistic missiles.

[Karpov] Reports like this evidently reflect the administration's actual plans. In the public statements made since Reykjavik by U.S. politicians and statesmen one can discern a tendency, so to speak, to revoke what President Reagan said in the Icelandic capital, to revoke his consent to the Soviet proposal on eliminating the entire strategic triad over 10 years. Yet this consent was given when Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev cited highly convincing arguments to the effect that the security interests of the United States and the USSR will be ensured to an equal degree only on condition of the elimination of the entire triad.

Unfortunately this tendency -- to backtrack -- is also visible in connection with medium-range missiles in Europe.

This tendency reflects something which has figured in the U.S. position for a long time -- even, perhaps, throughout the period of the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms: Under cover of talking about nuclear arms reduction, Washington has all the time been submitting proposals permitting...the buildup of the U.S. strategic potential, which, according to available estimates, now comprises some 14,000 nuclear charges.

[Shalnev] Let us come back to the question of medium-range missiles. The impression is created that the United States and some of its allies in Western Europe are moving away not only from the "zero option," but also from the "two-track decision" adopted by NATO in December 1979. That decision, as is well known, provides, on the one hand, for deployment of American cruise missiles and Pershing-2 missiles in Western Europe, and on the other, for holding talks on eliminating missiles.

[Karpov] It is true that a paradoxical situation is emerging. The authors of the "two-track decision," in adopting it, referred to the existence of Soviet SS-20 missiles as the main and more or less only reason for deploying American missiles on the European Continent. Now, however, when the USSR is proposing to eliminate the SS-20's -- and correspondingly the American medium-range missiles -- the position of those who adopted the "two-track decision" is changing radically. Now, it seems, it is necessary to fulfill a whole series of other conditions concerning, in particular, missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km and conventional types of armed forces and armaments. In other words, the question of the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles is becoming a kind of hostage. Incidentally, speaking of conventional types of arms: Last summer the Warsaw Pact countries put forward radical proposals on this score. A response to these proposals has yet to be received from NATO. NATO is delaying its reply, and in parallel it is making the question of medium-range missiles dependent on the question of conventional types of arms. It is a vicious circle.

[Shalnev] "Star Wars" and the ABM Treaty. Washington is trying to prove that this treaty, far from hampering the "Star Wars" program, could even stimulate it. Is that so?

[Karpov] Article V of the treaty, which was concluded by the USSR and the United States in 1972, bans, in particular, the development [sozdaniye], testing, and deployment of ABM systems or their components which are space-based. Assertions that this ban applies only to the systems which existed at the time the treaty was concluded do not accord with what is actually recorded in the treaty or with the agreed statements on it, in particular agreed statement "D." SDI is incompatible with the treaty in the spirit and the letter. There is no possible way to squeeze the "Star Wars" program into the treaty framework, however you may disguise it.

The American side says SDI is a purely research program, and that the program will remain within the research framework for the 10-year period discussed in Reykjavik. But in fact, the position the Soviet Union put forward in Reykjavik was founded on that very thesis. The West claims the USSR linked the resolution of all other questions at Reykjavik to President Reagan's renunciation of the SDI program, and thereby doomed the meeting to failure in advance. But that is absolutely untrue. We proposed and continue to propose to the President -- our proposals remain in force -- that agreement be reached that research and testing under the SDI program not go beyond the bounds of the laboratories, that there be no tests in space of space-based components of an ABM system, and that what is banned in Article V of the treaty not take place. [paragraph continues]

If the President has agreed to this, he would have agreed to comply with the ABM Treaty and would have confirmed what he is always saying -- that is, he would have confirmed the research nature of the SDI program. But the President did not do this. That means that there is a very profound difference between the statements about the research nature of the program and actual deeds.

[Shalnev] One last thing: Viktor Pavlovich, what will be your mood, as head of the Soviet delegation, on returning to Geneva?

[Karpov] Very substantial, solid foundations were laid in Reykjavik for making progress, for resolving, above all, the questions connected with strategic offensive arms, medium-range missiles in Europe, and ending nuclear weapon tests. Of course, difficult talks lie ahead. But we are in businesslike mood. If both sides build on the foundations laid in Reykjavik, I think a rapid, profound breakthrough could be secured in resolving the problem of preventing an arms race in space and ending it on earth.

U.S. GENEVA ORDERS COUNTER REYKJAVIK AGREEMENTS

LD310412 Moscow World Service in English 2300 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Speaking in Rapid City, South Dakota, on Wednesday President Reagan said that the U.S. arms control proposals offered in Iceland remain on the table. We are ready to take up where we left off in Reykjavik, the President said, during his campaign rally for a Republican senator.

Good evening. It's truly indicative, I think, that Reykjavik is in the center of attention during the current election campaign in the United States. There can be no doubt in my view that the public sentiments are in favor of continuing the process started in Iceland and the political leaders fully realize this. The thing is, however, that the process of seeking mutually acceptable agreements on cutting and eliminating nuclear arsenals requires concrete deeds. What is absolutely necessary, in my opinion, is both sides' readiness to adhere to what was agreed upon in Reykjavik with regard to nuclear weapons. How can there be any progress if the United States disputes the basic understandings reached there?

I wonder whether all the Americans are familiar with the fact that Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan came to terms in Reykjavik on a 50 percent reduction of strategic arms in the next 5 years and on the full liquidation of all strategic weapons by 1996. [passage omitted]

Now it looks strange but the basic and far-reaching agreements on nuclear weapons taken on the Soviet Union's initiative are being revised in Washington. For example, high-ranking officials of the Republican administration assert that the President did not give his consent on eliminating all strategic weapons of both sides by 1996. Moreover, some major instructions just sent to the American delegation at the Geneva talks actually repeat the pre-Reykjavik position of the United States -- I mean the position with respect to both nuclear weapons and the Star Wars program -- judging by the information leaked into the American press.

On Wednesday, the United States President said: We want to confirm and build on the agreements reached in Iceland. In this connection the question arises: Why do the instructions to the American delegation in Geneva run in an opposite direction?

PONOMAREV COMMENTS ON U.S. POLICY 'ZIG-ZAGS'

LD301603 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1505 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow, 30 Oct -- Leonid Ponomarev, a TASS commentator, writes:

Thoroughly entangled in their own versions of the American stance at the Reykjavik meeting, representatives of the U.S. Administration have, it would seem, been unable to find anything better than to fall back on their old proposals for arms verification [kontrol], in this way taking a leap backwards. Appearing in Rapid City, South Dakota, the chief of the White House declared that the proposals he had taken to Reykjavik "remain on the negotiating table" for talks with the Soviet Union, and the United States is prepared to start discussing them. And to discuss them "from a position of strength," which is ensured for Washington, supposedly, by the Star Wars program.

In this connection it would be worth recalling the baggage that the Americans brought to the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik. Not a single new thought, not a single fresh approach, not a single idea that promised even a hint of an outcome or any movement forward. However, even this did not dishearten the Soviet side.

Nevertheless, following lengthy debates they managed to reach an understanding on the matter of ways to reduce the two sides' triad of strategic offensive weapons.

This means the ground-based missiles, strategic submarines, and strategic bombers. It was only the U.S. unwillingness to limit research, development, and testing [issledovaniye, razrabotka, i ispytaniye] of SDI to the laboratory, and the U.S. desire to break into space with weapons, that brought the whole process of rapprochement to a standstill. Now the Washington administration is making what amounts to dizzying pirouettes on its policies, in order to create a semblance of readiness to come to agreement with the USSR. In the sphere of strategic weapons, for example, the U.S. leaders have separated strategic ballistic missiles from everything, and are making statements about consent to "come to an understanding" about reductions of them and even total elimination of them over 10 years. Meanwhile, they would still like to leave themselves the strategic bombers and cruise missiles, of which the United States has more.

In fact, administration officials admitted at Reykjavik that at the Soviet-U.S. meeting the sides "were close" to an agreement on prohibiting all, let us emphasize, all strategic weapons in a stated 10-year period. Now they are talking only about ballistic missiles.

To add to it all, as becomes clear from articles in the American press, Washington is demanding a separate solution to the question of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Can these zig-zags, this kind of jumping from side to side, really be called a serious policy? Of course not. Even the American press cannot recall responsible governments changing their position with this kind of ease.

For our part, we can state that the Soviet side has left on the negotiating table all those of its proposals that were spelled out at Reykjavik in complete sincerity and in a completely direct manner. The Soviet Union has invested a maximum of goodwill in them. But accords are possible only given the same kind of goodwill and sincerity on the other side. Meanwhile Washington is displaying neither the one nor the other.

BOGACHEV SCORES U.S. NUCLEAR TEST BAN STANCE

LD301727 Moscow TASS in English 1643 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS -- TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed at the Soviet-American summit meeting in Iceland that the two countries immediately sit down to negotiations on a nuclear test ban. Showing flexibility and readiness to work out mutually acceptable decisions, the Soviet side announced its readiness to review at some point in those negotiations the question of "ceilings" on the yield of nuclear blasts, the question of the number of nuclear explosions a year and the fate of the treaties on the limitation of the yield of subterranean nuclear weapons tests and on nuclear tests for peaceful purposes, which had not been ratified through the fault of the United States. This approach of the Soviet Union made it possible to work out a full-scale treaty on the total and ultimate prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

The sides were close to working out a mutually acceptable formula on that important issue in Reykjavik. The USSR announced, in particular, that it did not make the beginning of the talks on the total and ultimate prohibition of nuclear testing conditional on the U.S. joining the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions.

The Soviet Union's clear and unambiguous proposals on nuclear and space weapons, put forward by the Soviet leader in Reykjavi, were appreciated by the world public as a realistic program of lessening the threat of nuclear war and achieving a breakthrough in international relations, a program which was making it possible to advance toward a nuclear-free world.

U.S. officials had to perform circus tricks in a bid to gloss over in the eyes of world public opinion the obstructionist stand of the U.S. Administration on the "Star Wars", which blocked large-scale agreements on disarmament, including a nuclear test ban accord. Meanwhile, Washington politicians no longer say that an end to nuclear testing is the ultimate goal of the Reagan administration. Conversely, they point out more and more often that nuclear testing is needed to modernize weapons of mass annihilation--that is, to continue the nuclear arms race in perpetuity.

U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, making public statements after the Soviet-American summit in Iceland, used several times a play of words to his liking, saying that the sides had reached accord in Reykjavik on the notes but not on the melody. There is every reason to believe that the "melody" Shultz is so fond of is the continued roar of nuclear explosions at the U.S. Nevada test site.

The Soviet nuclear test sites, meanwhile, have been silent for almost 16 months now. The USSR will honour its moratorium on all nuclear explosions till January 1, 1987.

One cannot agree more with Shultz's remark to the CBS T.V. company that, in the field of nuclear testing, "The melody they (the Soviet Union -- V.B.) want to play around that is different from the melody we want to play."

CHERNYSHEV ATTACKS U.S. ARGUMENTS FOR SDI

PM301421 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Oct 86 Second Edition p 3

[Colonel (Reserve) V. Chernyshev article: "'Star' Stories and Chasing Rainbows"]

[Text] U.S. Administration spokesmen are now trying to suggest that the USSR and the United States are moving toward an agreement on eliminating the nuclear threat. They do this despite the fact that official Washington intends to retain SDI and the "Star Wars" program, which, as is well known, is the main obstacle to a possible accord on establishing a nuclear-free world.

Aiming to enhance the "prestige" of SDI and camouflage its true aim, Washington has invented a whole series of stories clearly designed for uninformed people. These sometimes fantastic fabrications include, in particular, the following.

First: Even after the complete elimination of nuclear weapons the U.S. need for SDI will not diminish since an antimissile "shield" is allegedly a "guarantee" that the Soviet Union will fulfill the agreement. This statement is at the very least not to be taken seriously.

For in order to ensure total certainty that adopted commitments will be fulfilled, complete clarity is needed with regard to verification [kontrol]. That is logical. And the Soviet leader firmly stated in Reykjavik that verification [kontrol] should be tightened up in connection with the readiness to make deep cuts in nuclear arms and with the beginning of the specific stage of the elimination of nuclear weapons. The USSR has reaffirmed its readiness for any forms of verification [kontrol] which would ensure total assurance for each side that it would not find itself in a trap. But to propose the accumulation of mountains of weapons in space and presenting those mountains as a kind of "verification [kontrol] system" is simply ludicrous.

Second: Even if there were no nuclear weapons in the world, Washington claims that SDI would be a kind of "insurance policy" for the United States, since it will defend it if "some madman" acquires a nuclear missile and decides to "subjugate" the nonnuclear United States. This scenario about a "madman" clearly comes from Hollywood. To be serious, Washington hardly took account of a "mythical individual" when hatching its plans to create [sozdaniye] a large-scale space-based ABM system. Such a system will cost it several trillion dollars -- the amount needed to fill near-earth space with strike space complexes -- and an additional $200 billion per year to service them.

Third: It is allegedly the U.S. SDI that brought the Russians to the negotiating table. Clearly some people in Washington seriously think that the Soviet Union can be addressed in the language of the "position-of-strength" policy and fail to realize that the other side is guided by lofty political responsibility and concern for universal security. The Reykjavik meeting confirmed that SDI is by no means a "trump card" at the talks which will bring its players success but, on the contrary, a mine which will torpedo any accords.

Fourth: There is no reason for the Soviet Union to oppose SDI, since "magnanimous America" is prepared to "share" the results of its work on the program. This thesis just cannot be taken seriously at all.

How can one be sure of the sincerity of this promise if the United States currently does not want to share with the Soviet Union even oil equipment or equipment for dairy plants? Moreover, even in the United States this verbal "generosity" prompts only sarcastic smiles. "Can the President be serious in saying this?" THE NEW YORK TIMES asks. "Does he mean to say that we will knock ourselvews out creating [sozdavaya] a space shield, spending innumerable billions of dollars, and using secrets which you can get locked up for even thinking about, and then share that technology with Moscow?" A high-ranking spokesman for the military-industrial complex stated bluntly: "I simply do not understand this. It seems to run counter to everything else we are doing. It is simply senseless."

That statement is indeed extremely frank: Official Washington's current peace-loving rhetoric clearly runs counter to its practical actions. Evidence of that is provided not only by the fact that in Reykjavik the U.S. Administration put a "Star" barrier in the way of nuclear disarmament. In recent days the White House has also taken action which bluntly attests to the absence of any desire on its part to even maintain the atmosphere needed for continuing the dialogue.

Clearly the U.S. "hawks" scared of Reykjavik are now rubbing their hands in satisfaction. You get the impression that the White House is sacrificing the vital interests of its own people, its allies, and international security as a whole to the arms manufacturers. In calling black white it is clearly hoping to get its own way by maintaining the pace of military preparations, expediting the "Star Wars" program, and stepping up pressure in all directions.

Now clothing SDI in propaganda garb, official Washington is keeping silent about the official documents and statements which clearly set out its aggressive intentions. Take, for instance, the "1984-1988 Defense Guidance," which nobody has refuted or rescinded. This fundamental Pentagon document for military building envisages the "development [razrabotka] of space-based systems" including means of destroying Soviet satellites, and the expedited creation [sozdaniye] of ABM systems to protect U.S. territory. One of the aims of these "measures" is also clearly proclaimed: "We must direct military rivalry with the USSR into new spheres and thereby make all preceding Soviet defense spending senseless and all Soviet weapons obsolete." The U.S. President himself confirmed this expenditure on 22 May 1984 -- that is, a year after he had announced SDI -- by stating: "They (the russians, that is) cannot compete with us and win in the sphere of building up arms."

The main tasks of the strategy of "direct confrontation" between the United States and the USSR announced in June 1981 by the Pentagon chief are: to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union and ensure U.S. readiness to wage a war in order to "make the USSR end hostilities as soon as possible on U.S. terms." The Pentagon is instructed to be prepared to "effectively wage a war" using space means. And it is pointed out that the United States should not sign any treaties which would prevent the creation [sozdavat] of a weapons system in space that "adds weight to our existing potential," since in opening up "new spheres of military rivalry," these weapons systems could alter the correlation of forces to the advantage of the United States.

This "philosophy" and these directives to executive organs reflect the real policy and practice of the current U.S. Administration. All this confirms that SDI is part and parcel of U.S. military doctrine, whose essence is to chase the rainbow of military superiority.

Official Washington clearly does not want to recognize the reality of the nuclear space age and learn the lessons of history. Nobody in Washington wants to realize that it is impossible to return to the fifties, that the dreams about an era of military-strategic superiority are nothing but illusions, and that the price of a mistake in such calculations could be the death of human civilization. The plain truth is that the Soviet Union will not sit idly by but will do everything to wreck the transatlantic figures' adventurist plans. This has already happened with the "nuclear blackmail" attempt, to which the USSR responded by creating [sozdat] its own nuclear shield. This will also be the case if any attempt is made to wreck military-strategic parity. Our country does not intend to copy the U.S. SDI. But there will be a response to it -- an asymmetrical but certainly effective response.

PRAVDA ROUNDTABLE ON PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CURBS

PM300945 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Oct 86 First Edition pp 1, 4

[B. Kotov and N. Prozhogin report: "After Reykjavik: The Prospects for a Nuclear-Free World. International 'Roundtable' in the PRAVDA Editorial Office"]

[Text] The Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik stirred the whole world. It brought the struggle against the nuclear threat to a new stage, raised the level of Soviet-U.S. dialogue, and for the first time in many decades advanced its participants a long way in the search for paths to nuclear disarmament.

But Reykjavik not only gave rise to hopes, it also spotlighted the difficulties on the way to a nuclear-free world. As a ray of hope began to dawn for many of those people in the West who only quite recently were loudly cursing nuclear weapons, they began to equally zealously demonstrate that nuclear weapons must not be renounced.

There is a continuing lively debate over Reykjavik, both over the gains associated with it and over the missed opportunities. The different viewpoints on these questions were also reflected in a discussion that took place recently in the PRAVDA editorial office.

The foreign participants were Leslaw Tokarski, chief editor of the weekly PERSPEKTYWY (Poland); (Rajah) Mohan, staffer of the Defense Studies and Analysis Institute (India); Yasuo Suzuki, deputy chief of the international department of the newspaper YOMIURI (Japan); Eva Karnowski, commentator for the newspaper VORWAERTS (FRG); and James Jackson, chief of TIME magazine's Moscow bureau (United States). On the Soviet side were PRAVDA political observers Yuriy Zhukov and Vsevolod Ovchinnikov. The international "roundtable" was chaired by Yevgeniy Grigoryev, the newspaper's deputy chief editor.

New Thinking -- New Modus Operandi [subhead]

Ovchinnikov: After Reykjavik it has become even more clear that the world has approached a point where the further continuation of the arms race could result in even strategic equilibrium and parity ceasing to be a deterrent factor. The problem of security cannot be solved by endlessly improving sword and shield. What is needed is not superweapons but superpolitics.

Nuclear weapons have changed not only the strategy and tactics but also the philosophy of war as a means of achieving political ends. [paragraph continues]

This is what Einstein had in mind when he said that the atom bomb has fundamentally changed the world and that a new way of thinking is needed for the new situation. The question "to be or not to be" is no longer something for individual reflection. It faces all mankind.

New thinking is the key to mankind's survival under the conditions of the nuclear and space age. The world spiit apart by contradictions must be aware of its integrity. I think the "Delhi Six" expressed this commonality of destiny well: "Each day of our life is alms, as though all mankind has become a prisoner in a condemned cell, waiting for the unknown moment of execution."

A new modus operandi must conform to the new thinking. The Soviet Union demonstrates this in practice -- both by its moratorium on nuclear explosions and by the package of proposals in Reykjavik.

Jackson: I was born and grew up close to Los Alamos, where atomic weapons were first created. Perhaps that is why I cannot be a supporter of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, although, based on the equilibrium of fear, it has helped to avoid war for 40 years. Now the champions of even that joyless doctrine have a reputation as "doves," while the "hawks" are champions of SDI.

I agree that a new way of thinking is needed to get ourselves out of this dilemma. everyone would like to rid himself of the burden of nuclear weapons. But a cautious approach must be taken to this, so that peace and security are not vulnerable to conventional arms which are comparable with nuclear arms in terms of their might. We must seek to avoid both nuclear and conventional war. It is a pity that, owing to excessive emotion or tiredness, Reykjavik has become known as a conference which ended in failure. Its participants dispersed to their homes disappointed: Having gotten close to important accords, they were unable to secure them.

Nevertheless, a great deal was done in Reykjavik. The Soviet Union made important concessions. But the SDI program was a barrier that could not be surmounted. I hope that at the next summit meeting the U.S. and Soviet leaders will find a way to proceed from reciprocity of deterrence to reciprocity of trust founded on passive nonnuclear means of defense.

Mohan: As the only representative of the developing world here, I would like to say the following: Until recently the global problems of war and peace were considered the province of the great powers. I think the participation of developing countries in the debate on this topic should be welcomed. "Third World" countries cannot and do not want to remain detached observers. India has always been at the forefront of the struggle for nuclear disarmament and advocated a nuclear test ban. The initiatives of the "Delhi Six" have elicited a broad response. We are glad that the USSR responded to their appeal and extended the moratorium.

The problem of war and peace affects the interests of all countries. We need new political thinking in order to find the way out of a critical situation.

Karnowski: All peoples are interested in contributing to the cause of disarmament and participating in the discussion of problems of war and peace. The Soviet-American dialogue must take more account of the situatiuon in Western Europe. As a German, I represent the German land, where war could break out. Chemical weapons and medium-range nuclear weapons pose a special threat to us. Yes, we all need new thinking.

Ovchinnikov: Mr Jackson spoke of one of the reasons for his negative attitude to the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. It really should be replaced. Only not by "passive nonnuclear means of defense." He seems to have in mind SDI, which would mean a new twist to the arms race spiral. It is another matter to arrive at a common understanding of the components of security in the nuclear age. A state's security used to be considered directly proportional to its military potential and was identified with strength. Now security can only be mutual, and on a global plane it can only be universal. It is this understanding of security that is the starting point of the new thinking.

Suzuki: I think that, as in the past, there will be periods of ups and downs in Soviet-American relations. I believe that now is a propitious time for reaching an accord. Unfortunately, agreements were not signed. But, in my opinion, there are hopes of success in the long run. Why? Although R. Reagan's administration has encountered very serious economic difficulties, it has managed to enlist support among Americans. On the other hand, the Soviet people pin great hopes on M.S. Gorbachev's administration, which is seeking to impart greater dynamism to the USSR's development.

I believe that the West will value Moscow's initiatives on their true merits and respond to them. I think the talks will proceed from the points reached in Reykjavik. A difficult dialogue lies ahead, but I would like to believe there will be progress.

Tokarski: I would like to return to what Mr Jackson said. In my opinion, it is not a matter of emotion or tiredness but of a different approach to competition between the two systems -- capitalist and socialist. Will it be peaceful rivalry or a military clash tantamount to a global catastrophe? The West maintains that socialism does not display an innovative approach to new problems. But who, if not Washington, displays dogmatism, always relying on strength in everything? The socialist countries draw conclusions from the new situation and take a new look at what is happening in the world. The USSR and its allies have founded their international policy on the principle of peaceful coexistence throughout the postwar period. Hence their conviction that, despite the difficulties that came to light in Reykjavik, the dialogue must continue.

Zhukov: The participants in our discussion seem to agree on the need for new thinking. This is important because, unfortunately, old thinking is more characteristic of many mass media workers outside this "roundtable." I saw this for my self at the World Congress of Peace-Loving Forces in Copenhagen, from which I have just returned. There the results of Reykjavik were examined and the tasks of all antiwar forces determined, regardless of their ideological thrust. So, instead of creating an atmosphere conducive to the successful work of the congress, the Western press did everything to hinder it. It failed. The congress was a success. But the attempts to use the results of Reykjavik to fuel pessimism in the antiwar movement are revealing.

The work done in Reykjavik must not go to waste. It revealed the sides' agreement to totally eliminate strategic nuclear arms by 1996. I believe that it is the task of the mass media to help this to become reality. It is necessary to advocate the strengthening of the ABM Treaty. The United States is conducting a campaign of disinformation aimed at convincing the public that the USSR proposes the revision of that treaty. [paragraph continues]

In fact, the USSR's position is that the contries that are party to the treaty should not pull out of it for 10 years and should strictly observe all its provisions.

I agree that sight should not be lost of conventional arms either. But let us recall the proposal advanced in Budapest by the Warsaw Pact countries to begin talks on reducing arms and armed forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Why has it still not met with a response from the NATO countries?

Moderator: I wish to throw several logs onto the flaring fire of debate. I will remind you that NATO generals were very concerned as soon as there was talk of the possible elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe and strategic arms in general. Some people in Washington also started saying that before abandoning the nuclear potential equilibrium should be established in conventional forces and, moreover, a change should be secured in the "political climate" in the USSR. But until this happens, they say, the nuclear potential must be preserved as a "means of deterrence." In short, in addition to shoots of the new thinking, there is also a thinking determined by the old categories of strength.

Jackson: I am no specialist in military matters. But it seems to me that the approach to arms reduction in Europe is of paramount significance. The Warsaw Pact countries are superior to NATO as regards conventional kinds of arms. So, I agree with those NATO generals who say that, before departing from the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, it is necessary to find ways to balance conventional kinds of arms.

The proposals advanced in Budapest have been mentioned here. The West has made certain concessions regarding the rules for counting numbers. I think that the new thinking must also be applied to a considerable extent to the size of the armed forces stationed in Europe, as well as in other parts of the world. Without this it is difficult to speak of eliminating nuclear weapons.

Mohan: I am no great supporter of the concept of nuclear deterrence, which Jackson and Ovchinnikov have mentioned. Even in a world free from nuclear weapons the concept of deterrence would be fraught with great dangers. The tragedies in Chernobyl and Bhopall have made it obvious that in densely populated and industrially developed countries war will result in tremendous casualties even without nuclear weapons being used.

Ovchinnikov: Yes, it is also necessary to struggle against conventional war. But the nuclear disarmament program is just part of what the USSR proposes in putting forward the idea of an all-embracing system of international security. It incorporates both the elimination of chemical weapons and a deep cut in conventional arms.

Karnowski: I have a question for my Soviet colleagues. It is said in journalistic circles that the USSR is ready to agree to tests of SDI's ground components outside the laboratory.

Zhukov: The Soviet position has been clearly defined by M.S. Gorbavhev. Taking the U.S. President's attachment to that program into account, the USSR did not demand an end to work on SDI on condition that it does not go outside the laboratories. But the American side would like not just to tackle research but also to test these weapons, including in space, in order to start series production in 10 years' time. Agreeing to this would mean resorting to immense deception of public opinion. People would believe that the ABM Treaty was being observed, while in fact it would have been deliberately made null and void.

What Then Is SDI? [subhead]

Moderator: I will read out one of the numerous letters from our readers. Here is what N. Turov of Kiev writes: "I was struck by the fact that the American side, while being ready in principle to make significant reductions in the arms sphere, refused point-blank to curtail the SDI program. Why do the Americans cling so stubbornly to SDI?" We, too, ought to examine this question.

Suzuki: The Americans believe that SDI will reduce the danger of nuclear war. Why is the USSR against going over from offensive to defensive arms?

Zhukov: What do you yourself think, Mr Suzuki, why are we against SDI?

Suzuki: Perhaps because the energy of nuclear explosions will be utilized under the SDI program?

Ovchinnikov: SDI is a program for the creation [sozdaniye] of multipurpose space weapons designed to neutralize targets both in space and on the earth and, in particular, to destroy satellites -- which would mean making the other side blind and deaf. What kind of a defensive system is that?

Tokarski: The question of disarmament is a question not just for the USSR and the United States but for all states. Poland has been active in this direction, starting with the 1957 Rapacki plan to create a nuclear-free zone in central Europe. Unfortunately, not everyone advances initiatives. Neutral European states have played a positive role at the Stockholm conference. They are also contributing to the holding of the Vienna talks. But no initiatives are to be seen from states such as the FRG, Britain, France, and Japan. Some Western states have agreed to participate in the development [razrabotka] of SDI. Is such a step legitimate, for example, for the state on whose territory Hiroshima stands?

Suzuki: President Reagan long ago wanted Japan to support the SDI program. Tokyo expressed understanding of that program and then decided to participate in it. The Japanese Government proceeds from the premise that SDI does not run counter to the ABM Treaty and is not a means of achieving U.S. military superiority over the USSR. As a member of the Western camp, Japan must make a contribution to strengthening its deterrent potential.

Japan would like not to participate in SDI. But, selling far more goods to the United States than it buys from there, because of difficulties in trade and economic relations with the United States Japanhas to make concessions in other matters. One of the concessions is participation in SDI.

Karnowski: When speaking of SDI, frequent mention is made of FRG support for that program. I think that mention should be made of the federal government, not of the whole country. There are different viewpoints on SDI in the FRG. There is a government agreement with the Americans on this question. But broad sections of the population and many political parties disagree with its position.

Zhukov: The American side maintains that SDI is being created [sozdat] exclusively against missiles. And yet an accord was reached in Reykjavik that nuclear weapons are to be destroyed by 1996. What, then, is the purpose of SDI? [paragraph continues]

I answer this question as follows: To hit targets in space and on the earth from space. Space weapons would be a totally new type of offensive weapon. And we are opposed to them.

Jackson: I am surprised that Soviet journalists and Soviet spokesmen believe that the purpose of SDI is to destroy targets on the ground. This is not the task set by President Reagan. The purpose of SDI is to use nonnuclear means to hamper the opposing side's use of offensive kinds of arms. It would be useful if the Soviet side agreed that this is the purpose of SDI.

But if it became possible to eliminate all types of strategic weapons by 1996, then SDI would really have no point either for defensive purposes or as an offensive system, so the Soviet Union believes. Therefore, in my view, what is needed is talks which will lead to the elimination of both sides' strategic weapons. When the existing strategic system disappears, the SDI system will also become pointless.

Karnowski: At the start of our discussion I was filled with optimism. We spoke of new thinking, and that encouraged me. But I am once again getting a pessimistic feeling. The United States does not want to abandon SDI, and the USSR says that the strategic arms talks will produce no result unless the United States abandons SDI.

How do you conceive the further development of events? As an inhabitant of Europe, I am concerned at the question: Will Pershings and SS-20's be kept there? Will Europeans have to continue living side by side with them? And another thing that troubles me -- our Indian colleague touched on it: We say the USSR and the United States must eliminate their nuclear weapons and agree on their zero level. But is mankind ready to eliminate what is has created? And what about the nuclear plans of other certain states?

Mohan: In America there are different approaches to the SDI program. First, what was originally proposed by President Reagan was the creation [sozdaniye] of a space shield to cover the United States. Many scientists believe that it is practically impossible to create [sozdat] such a shield. Another concept is more likely -- the defense of launch sites and command centers.

Another thing: I cannot understand what the United States is striving for at the talks. It was originally believed that the USSR would never accept the zero option for "Euromissilies.' But the USSR did accept it. What about the United States? A gap has emerged in its position. There is a discrepancy between the publicly proclaimed U.S. proposals and its true aims.

Jackson: I agree that statements by U.S. Adminsitration spokesmen are vague. But account must be taken of midterm elections to be held in the United States in November. This is the least favorable time for ascertaining the adminstration's clear political position. Perhaps my Soviet colleagues will not agree with me, but it makes sense to wait and see what happens after the elections.

Ovchinnikov: Mr Mohan spoke of different concepts of SDI. The idea of an all-embracing space shield is illusory. The variant defense of the positions of strategic missiles and command centers is more likely. But in precisely this way SDI would block disarmament by upsetting the established balance of forces.

Americans say to us: "Create [sozdavat] your own SDI system." But we want to disarm together, not arm together. [paragraph continues]

SDI can essentially have two purposes: to secure military superiority over us and economically drain us of blood. This has no prospects.

Suzuki: My colleague Mohan said that the USSR has submitted good proposals and raised the question of why the Americans have not agreed to them. We must acknowledge that mistrust exists between the United States and the USSR. Reykjavik showed this. There are contradictions that cannot be resolved immediately. Reagan deserves criticism, but he must be given time to think.

Tokarski: It is frequently said that just the elimination of nuclear weapons is the key to solving the chief problems of the present day. I think that the key can only be the comprehensive resolution of a package of problems: the elimination of strategic arms and medium-range missiles and the strengthening of the ABM Treaty. When it is said that Reagan needs time to think, I understand that it is a question of the time needed to realize that these problems must be examined as a package.

Zhukov: I agree that it is a question of interconnected problems. This does not mean that the USSR wants all or nothing. We consider it possible and necessary to examine each problem individually. This is why there are three groups in Geneva -- on space weapons, on medium-range missiles, and on strategic arms. But logic demands that the decision be made as a whole, when accords have been reached on all three questions. To eliminate nuclear weapons while leaving space weapons -- it is unrealistic to put the question like this.

Moderator: The SDI problem has led to more mistrust and has aggravated difficulties in world politics and international relations. It acts as a block on nuclear disarmament and has become a kind of symbol of unwillingness to take any specific steps in this direction. The ABM Treaty is clear and unambiguous on what is and what is not allowed. The USSR proposed adherence to its provisions. The U.S. side did not agree to this.

The question is: What practical steps are to be taken to move matters further toward a nuclear-free world. In this context I would like to ask: How, under the prevailing circumstances, do you assess the importance of such actions by the USSR as the termination of all nuclear explosions and our unilateral moratorium? What role could be played by the termination of nuclear tests altogether?

Suzuki: In principle, the moratorium is a positive phenomenon. We understand that it was not easy for the USSR to take this step. But the United States has its reasons for acting otherwise. It is difficult to demand that the United States terminate nuclear tests before a mutually acceptable solution is found.

Zhukov: Why is it difficult to demand it?

Suzuki: Because it is difficult to convince the Americans to change their stance.

Jackson: M.S. Gorbachev's political daring is admirable. It was not easy to announce and repeatedly extend the moratorium under conditions where the United States refuses to follow the USSR's example. I admire the moratorium as a political step. In my opinion, however, from a technical viewpoint the moratorium is like placing the cart before the horse. [paragraph continues]

Since both sides expressed in Reykjavik readiness to sharply reduce their nuclear arsenals, it is necessary to correspondingly restrict nuclear tests. When nuclear weapons are eliminated, there will be no need for tests.

Mohan: From India's point of view, the termination of tests is a most important step toward curbing the arms race. We are pleased that the USSR has deemed it possible on four occasions to extend its unilateral moratorium. As regards the verification [kontrol] of moratorium observance, this, in my view, is no longer a problem. Recently the USSR has taken important steps in this sphere by agreeing to on-site inspections. But the point is, evidently, that the modernization of nuclear arsenals demands continuation of tests. They are being conducted for the sake of the SDI program's implementation.

Ovchinnikov; Our U.S. colleague approves of the moratorium as a political step, but considers that, technically speaking, halting the tests means "putting the cart before the horse." I am convinced that the "horse" is before the cart. And it is indeed the moratorium that could get the nuclear disarmament wagon moving. The most radical, simplest, and most universal method of halting the qualitataive improvement of nuclear weapons is to terminate tests of them.

Zhukov: Our moratorium was not just a political step, it was a serious practical measure. We still expect the United States to follow our example, just as all peoples demand it.

Difficulties and Hopes [subhead]

Moderator: Life is posing the question of the responsibility of governments, peoples, and the public for what happens to our world.

Karnowski: I agree. A broad discussion on this subject is going on in NATO countries. European states like Britain and even the FRG are not making full use of opportunities to influence U.S. policy.

And yet it cannot be said that West Europe and the FRG in particular are, on the whole, evading their responsibility. In my country there are forces, like, for example, the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD], which are aware of their responsibility for the cause of peace. Let me recall in this context the joint SPF-SED proposal on the creation of a corridor free from battlefield nuclear weapons. I could cite the names of West European social democrats who have put forward numerous important initiatives -- Willy Brandt, Olof Palme....

Mohan: India submitted in the United Nations a draft resolution pointing out the danger of nuclear tests and the buildup of nuclear weapons. For their part, the USSR and China have declared that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. The majority of countries support this initiative and it is obvious that there can be further progress along this path. Efforts must also be made to ban chemical weapons. As a counterbalance to the SDI program, it would be useful to create a world organization which would serve the cause of cooperation between states in peaceful exploration of space.

Tokarski: G. Marchais, secretary general of the French Communist Party, spoke aptly about the public's responsibility in the contemporary world by describing it as the "third force." This assessment of the role played by public opinion is made not only by communist parties. [paragraph continues]

It is appropriate to its effectiveness. We saw that in the case of the public's struggle against neutron weapons. I believe public opinion also contributed to everything positive achieved in Reykjavik. I think that the opinion of public organizations and movements is very important for the subsequent stages of the talks.

Zhukov: Some 2,500 public representatives from all corners of the world attended the Copenhagen congress, and 1,870 of them gave speeches. There were many arguments. After all, it was an active dialogue between representatives of various ideological trends. Nevertheless, they reached agreement on the need to launch immediately a joint or a parallel struggle to achieve three specific objectives: elimination of nuclear weapons, prevention of the militarization of space, and termination of nuclear tests. Many participants in the congress signed an appeal which formulated these objectives.

Jackson: The United States is experiencing a difficult period in relations with the USSR, and the whole world feels this. But we recall some equally complex situations -- the Cuban crisis, the war in Vietnam, and the events in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. But, for all that, there was no armed conflict. Crises were followed by periods of reduced tension, summit meetings took place, accords were reached. I want to express the hope that a new summit conference will take place and that effective accords in nuclear arms reduction will be signed.

Moderator: Allow me to read an excerpt from a letter received by PRAVDA from G. Mayorov, assistant diesel locomotive driver from the "Tsentrolit" Plant in Saransk. He recalls the history of inventions and pioneers in our country, from the Cherepanov brothers' steam locomotive to Korolev's rocket, from Lodygin's lamp to Gagarin's spaceflight. And then he addresses the U.S. President: "Do you think we have run out of inventors? You may threaten us with SDI, but do not think of us as weaker and stupider than the Americans. Bear in mind that our people will manage to give the the necessary response to any challenge. But what would such recklessness cost both countries, what calamaties would it bring to earth!" And he goes on: "Although our people and yours may have different ways of life, we have the same reflexes of life. Could the U.S. people want to commit suicide? We Soviet people want to live in peace. I wish you speedy recovery from political sclerosis." I wanted to tell you about this working man's viewpoint. It is typical of Soviet public opinion.

So, what next? Are we ready to take real steps toward a nuclear-free world? Can we expect common sense to triumph?

Mohan: It is necessary to ensure collective security for the whole world. We hope that future accords will be aimed at destroying nuclear weapons.

Having expressed this hope, I also want to say that even though the "Third World" countries still lack a broad movement of champions of peace like that in Europe, both the people and many governments in young states exert growing influence on the development of the international situation.

Tokarski: There has been too much pessimism in the world in the wake of Reykjavik. It stems from the fact that the struggle for peace and disarmament has been going on for a long time, while the progress achieved falls far short of the peoples' dreams. Yet Reykjavik did show that, given good will, it is possible to solve even the most complex problems. Optimism stems from the USSR's policy, its good will and desire to reach a compromise.

Jackson: We must be optimists. Significant progress was achieved in Reykjavik, marked by a striking volume of concessions. The leaders of the two powers discussed there the actual concept of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by 1996. Reykjavik helps one to be an optimist.

Karnowski: I hope that pressure from the West European public will help us not to have to wait too long for a new Soviet-U.S. summit meeting and that the problems discussed in Reykjavik will be finally resolved.

Ovchinnikov: It is said that politics is the art of the possible, the art of compromise. But compromises must be mutually acceptable. Now the U.S. side is showing a desire to break apart the package of Soviet proposals, extract all the concessions from it, and give nothing in return. But, as the saying goes, "It takes two to tango."

Suzuki: The USSR and the United States should not chase each other into blind alleys, they should make reciprocal concessions. I think that, in such an event, there will be success.

Zhukov: Quite broad public circles in the West still have a fear of the alleged "Soviet threat." This does not make matters any easier. We do not frighten our people with an American threat. We do not have anti-Americanism as such. We do not have this gut fear of America, like the fear of the USSR that is cultivated in the West. We do everything for better understanding of and cooperation with one another.

I agree with my colleagues that there is a chance to save mankind from destruction. There is a realistic chance for a turnabout toward a nuclear-free world. A practical solution to this historic task is made possible by our "package" in Reykjavik, which is based on the program for the elimination of nuclear arsenals by the year 2000 announced in mid-January. Ultimately everything depends on the people, on the common sense and responsiblity of political forces and statesmen, and on energetic actions by people of good will.

The feature ends with the following boxed item carried under the headline "Strategic Disarmament Initiative: The Foreign Participants in the 'Roundtable Discussion' on M.S. Gorbachev's 22 October Speech on Soviet Television"]

L. Tokarski: The Washington administration, succumbing to pressure from the military-industrial complex, thinks and acts in the old way. It is particularly active in using hypocritical arguments in defense of SDI.

M.S. Gorbachev proved that such "arguments" are totally illogical. Contrasting the USSR's clear-cut stance with the U.S. Administration's cynical attitude, he named the problems which must be solved in the interests of all countries. This stance is fully shared by the Poles, a people familiar with the horrors of war.

J. Jackson: It seems to me that the tone of M.S. Gorbachev's latest speech is much tougher than his speeches immediately after Reykjavik. But, despite all the complexities and misunderstandings in relations between our two countries, I imagine that the dialogue aimed at achieving agreement on arms control will continue.

E. Karnowski: M.S. Gorbachev said in his speech that each day after Reykjavik makes it clear that the meeting in Iceland was the touchstone for testing the real value of words.

When Washington backs the "SDI horse," this means the threat of a new round of the arms race.

West Europe and many of its politicians lack activeness in questions of disarmament and primarily nuclear disarmament, decisiveness in distancing themselves from the SDI program, and consistency and persistence in solving the problems of conventional arms reductions.

Y. Suzuki: Mr Gorbachev's speech was simultaneously tough, considered, and constructive. It showed convincingly that the USSR has no intention of making unilateral concessions, that it is impossible to take from the negotiating table only that which suits the United States without giving anything in exchange.

Washington is evidently gripped by confusion. The daring and innovative nature of the Soviet proposals caught the U.S. Administration unawares.

It is pleasing that the Soviet Union does not slam shut the door on talks, considering that Reykjavik raised to a new level the dialogue between the USSR and the United States, between East and West. I would like to express the hope that talks will continue and that Moscow and Washington will pave with joint efforts the way to a nuclear-free world.

R. Mohan: M.S. Gorbachev's speech put in its proper place everything that occurred in Reykjavik, clearly reaffirmed the content of the Soviet proposals, and pointed out the reasons why the agreements that were virtually achieved failed to materialize. I fully agree that the implementation of the SDI program will involve the world in a new stage of the arms race and will destabilize the strategic situation. I would describe M.S. Gorbachev's proposals as a strategic disarmament initiative leading to a world without weapons and without wars.

ANTHOLOGY OF REYKJAVIK SUMMIT DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED

PM301109 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Oct 86 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "For the Sake of Peace on the Planet"]

[Text] An anthology entitled "The Soviet-U.S. Summit Meeting" [Sovetsko-Amerikanskaya Vstrecha na Vysshem Urovne] has been published. It contains materials on the 11-12 October 1986 meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in Reykjavik, a report on M.S. Gorbachev's press conference, the 14 and 22 October speeches by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on Soviet Television, and other documents.

The anthology has been published by the Political Literature Publishing House.

GERASIMOV VIEWS VARIOUS ISSUES AT PRESS BRIEFING

Observance of Human Rights Day

LD301507 Moscow TASS in English 1458 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Excerpt] Moscow October 30 TASS -- Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said here today at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists that a celebration sitting of the 41st session of the U.N. General Assembly devoted to the 20th anniversary of the adoption of international convenants on human rights was planned to be held on November 3.

He pointed out that those covenants -- one on economic, social and cultural rights and the other on civil and political rights -- had been adopted on the initiative of the Soviet Union.

According to Gerasimov, the non-ratification of both covenants by the United States is evidence of its unwillingness to recognize in deed and to exercise human rights, irrespective of what some people try to tell us. [passage omitted]

Vienna CSCE Meeting

AU281520 Paris AFP in English 1515 GMT 28 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow, Oct 28 (AFP) -- The meeting in Vienna next week of Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz should be an occasion for "continuing the Reykjavik talks," Foreign Mnistry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a press conference here Tuesday.

"If we stopped now," he said, "we could lose momentum. If Vienna did not exist, we would have invented it."

Mr Gerasimov also called Britain's breakoff of diplomatic relations with Syria and the recall of the U.S. ambassador to Damascus good examples of a "double standard" on the part of London and Washington.

FRG Stance on Nazi Crimes

LD301555 Moscow TASS in English 1538 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS -- An announcement has been made in the FRG on discontinuing investigation into the cases of former figures of Hitler justice, the so-called judges and prosecuting attorneys as well as the "people's court" of Nazi Reich, which passed from 1937 to 1945 a total of 5,243 death sentences on anti-fascists and other opponents of the Nazi regime.

Soviet public, Gennady Gerasimov, chief of the Information Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, told a briefing at the press centre of the USSR Foreign Ministry, cannot pass over that fact and cannot but express a negative attitude to the decision on putting an end to the prosecution of former Nazi judges in the FRG. He recalled that it is precisely the Soviet Union, which has suffered the greatest losses in the fight against Hitler Germany.

Satisfaction of the Soviet side was expressed at the briefing in connection with the decision of the Swedish Government to deny political asylum to Carl Linnas, former commandant of the Fascist concentration camp in the city of Tartu, who was sentenced by Soviet court to capital punishment in absentia. The Soviet Union proceeds from the corresponding international laws, according to which the Nazi war criminals should be extradited for trial and punishment to the countries where they committed their crimes. As regards Carl Linnas, the Soviet side has repeatedly requested the USA that he be extradited.

Laser Development

LD301434 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1340 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow, 30 Oct (TASS) -- At a briefing held here today, Gennadiy Gerasimov, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman, described as a "dead duck" a report in the West German newspaper BILD and then taken up by the Australian mass media, that the USSR was ahead of the United States on SDI and that, among other things, it had installed strategic defense lasers, one of which was located at Sarochiganak in Kazakhstan. Moreover, the Soviet Union, according to these false reports, is apparently using these lasers militarily and had shot down, or at least put out of action, three American satellites. On 29 October THE WASHINGTON POST carried an article that also mentioned the use by the Soviet Union of antisatellite weapons. It is claimed that over the past 6 months powerful rays of microwaves directed from Soviet territory into outer space, had more than once put American reconnaissance satellites out of action.

If the USSR is ahead of the United States in SDI, the Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesman said, why does the United Staes not agree with our proposal to halt research in this sphere, open monitoring laboratories, and place everything under control so as not to create space strike weapons?

The Soviet Union, Gennadiy Gerasimov stressed, has no laser weapons. And the United States knows this full well, because the USSR has given it explanations in this regard. In Sarochiganak there is an experimental laser device, but this is not a weapon. It can neither bring down nor put out of action satellites, and its purpose is merely to survey space and track targets in space. Thus the West German BILD, U.S. WASHINGTON POST and Australian mass media have spread slander.

Gennadiy Gerasimov then discussed a report in the U.S. WASHINGTON TIMES -- a newspaper known for its ties with the present U.S. Administration -- which, quoting U.S. intelligence sources, has published fatuous fabrications suggesting that the USSR is intending to open consulates in the Mexican towns of Ensenada and Cuidad Juarez. The paper conjectures that a Soviet consulate in Ensenada would be the ideal base for communications with some Soviet network of agents functioning at numerous military enterprises in California. As far as the consulate at Ciudad Juarez is concerned, it would be very nicely placed to conduct Soviet radio and electronic surveillance on SDI tests carried out at U.S. testing ranges in Fort Bliss and White Sands.

This, said the USSR Foreign Ministry representative, is yet another example of the stoking up of spy mania. By circulating such absurdities, the United States would like to cast a shadow over the development of Soviet-Mexican relations. In fact, the issue of opening the consulates mentioned has not been postulated -- that is, there was no such issue. It is all a fabrication, from beginning to end, off the top of the head, as the saying goes.

Answering a question concerning the arrest on 27 Octover in San Francisco of a certain Allan John Davis on a charge of spying for the Soviet Union, the representative of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs said: The U.S. FBI continues to play its games. They consist of FBI agents, pretending to be employees of the Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco, enticing certain Americans to sell them certain secrets, and then arresting them as "Soviet agents." And this was the case this time. This is the way, he noted, thousands of "Soviet spies" can be found in the United States.

These provocative games, G. Gerasimov stressed, are being used to whip up anti-Soviet hysteria and spy mania in the United States and to discredit Soviet representatives. The Foreign Ministry representative added that none of the employees of the USSR Consulate General in San Francisco had ever met nor had telephone contact with Davis.

UN URGES ISRAEL TO SURRENDER NUCLEAR 'UNITS'

LD301526 Moscow TASS in English 1501 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] New York October 30 TASS -- TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Chernyshev reports:

The U.N. General Assembly has called upon Israel to put without delay all its nuclear units under control of the International Atomic Energy Agency and denounced its stubborn refusal to comply with the previous U.N. decisions on the question of Tel Aviv's armed aggression against Iraqi nuclear structures in June 1981. In a resolutoin which was passed by an overwhelming majority of votes the General Assembly resolved that the question of dangerous consequences of Israel's policy for the internatioal system in the sphere of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, international peace and security be put on the agenda of the next session. The United States, Honduras, El Salvador, The Federation of Saint Christopher and Nevis voted against the resolution, along with Israel.

It was clear from the speeches made by representatives of Iraq, Bahrain, Oman, Syria, Czechoslovakia, Cyprus and other countries that Israel's refusal to sign the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, its cooperation in the nuclear sphere with the racists of the Republic of South Africa are the cause of concern of the international community. Israel's underground plant for the production of nuclear weapons in the Negev desert, the stockpiled arsenals of 100-200 nuclear bombs, according to the recent disclosures in the press, pose a particular threat to international peace and security, stressed the permanent representative of Gatar at the United Nations Hamad 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Kawari.

The General Assembly's consideration of the question of Israel's attack on Iraqi nuclear installations is particularly topical, since Israel with the obvious connivance of its supporters persists in carrying out the aggressive policy, said the USSR's permanent representative at the United Nations A.M. Belonogov. One feels now, as never before, the pernicious consequences of that outrageous act of state terrorism for the cause of peace and international security, for ensuring a fair and durable settlement of the Middle East problem.

MURAKHOVSKIY DEPARTS MONGOLIA FOR HOME

PM281241 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Departure for Home"]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 25 Oct -- The Soviet Government delegation headed by V.S. Murakhovskiy, first deputy chariman of the USSR Council of MInisters and chairman of the USSR State Agro-Industrial Committee, which took part in the work of the 31st session of the Soviet-Mongolian intergovernmental commission on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation, left Ulaanbaatar for home today.

The delegation was seen off at the airport by T. Ragchaa, member of the MPRP Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the Mongolian Council of Ministers, and other officials. USSR ambassador to Mongolia K.Ye. Fomichenko was among the send-off party.

PRAVDA on Return From Mongolia

PM281445 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Oct 86 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Return to Moscow]

[Text] On 25 October the Soviet Government delegation headed by V.S. Murakhovskiy, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR State Agro-Industrial Committee, returned to Moscow from Ulaanbaatar, after taking part in the work of the 31st session of the Soviet-Mongolian intergovernmental commission for economic and scientific and technical cooperation.

(Ts. Gombosuren), Mongolian charge d'affaires de interim to the USSR, was among those meeting the delegation at the airport.

UNIFIED U.S.-JAPAN COMMAND IN OKINAWA ANNOUNCED

LD282134 Moscow TASS in English 2018 GMT 28 Oct 86

[Text] Tokyo October 28 TASS -- Today the U.S. military command in Japan announced the setting up in Okinawa of a unified command of the U.S. Marines stationed in Japan, the KYODO TSUSHIN news agency reports.

Major General James L. Day has been appointed the commander of the U.S. Marine bases in Japan. Prior to the appointment he had been the commander of the Camp base.

The newly founded command will asssume the functions of administrative control over U.S. Marine bases in Japanese territory as well as coordinate the action of the U.S. Marines and Japanese Armed Forces.

Twenty thousand Marines are stationed in Okinawa and six thousand Marines are at bases in Japan proper. They are all part of the "Rapid Deployment Force" (RDF) which the Pentagon uses to suppress people's resistence to the U.S. diktat in various regions.

PHOUMI VONGVICHIT NAMED ACTING PRESIDENT OF LAOS

LD311010 Moscow TASS in English 0954 GMT 31 Oct 86

[Text] Vientiane October 31 TASS -- In conjunction with the state of health of Souphanouvong, president of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (L.P.D.R.), a joint session of the Supreme People's Assembly and the Council of Ministers of the L.P.D.R. took in Souphanouvong's presence the decision to appoint Phoumi Vongvichit, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and vice-prime minsiter of the L.P.D.R., acting president of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Radio Laos reported today.

SOVIET AMITY SOCIETY CHAIRMAN GREETS SIM KA

BK300426 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1300 GMT 29 Oct 86

[Text] Comrade (A.M. Paramonov), chairman of the USSR-PRK Friendship association and minsiter of textile of the USSR [roatthamontrei krasuong otsahakam dambanh], recently sent a congratulatory message to Comrade Sim Ka on his appointment as chairman of the PRK-USSR Friendship Association. The message read in part:

I wish you, all members of the leadership, and all personnel of the USSR-PRK Friendship Association greater successes in your lofty mission.

I am convinced that the all-round cooperation between the PRK-USSR Friendship association and the USSR-PRK Friendship Association will further strengthen in the interests of the USSR and PRK peoples and in strengthening peace and socialism.

THAI AIRCRAFT 'INTRUDED' CAMBODIAN AIRSPACE

LD300942 Moscow TASS in English 0839 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] Phnom Penh October 30 TASS -- Thai Airforce planes intruded in Kampuchea's air space more than twenty times during the period from October 2 to 26, the Kampuchean news agency SPK reported today.

Reconnaissance flights were conducted over the provinces of Batdambang and Siem Reab.

Thai military boats repeatedly violated Kampuchea's maritime borders in the region of Kong and Tang islands.

Districts in the provinces of Battambang, Pursat and Siem Reap were subjected to shelling on numerous occasions.

NEW TIMES CITES PRK'S HUN SEN ON ASIAN SECURITY

PM301745 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No. 42, 27 Oct 86 p 9

[Unnamed own correspondent interview with Hun Sen, member of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party Central committee Politburo, chairman of the PRK Council of Ministers, and PRK foreign minister: "Realism Must Prevail in Politics" -- date and place not given]

[Text] [Correspondent] What's your opinion of the proposed peace programme for the Asian-Pacific region that Mikhail Gorbachev announced in Vladivostok?

[Hun Sen] The statement made by general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee is of historic importance for the Asian and Pacific countries, for the whole planet. The initiatives, which are filled with a spirit of good will, are fresh evidence of the Soviet Union's peaceableness, of its highly responsible approach to the problem of safeguarding world peace.

The ideas and proposals put forward in Vladivostok accord with the most cherished aspirations of the people of Kampuchea. As everyone knows, we have paid a dear price for our freedom and independence -- I am referring to our long fight, together with the fraternal peoples of Vietnam and Laos, against colonialism, militarism, imperialism and, finally, the Pol Pot regime of genocide that was even more barbarous than Hitler's. Peace is an indispensible condition for the fulfillment of our plans for the country's reconstruction. We have joined hands with Vietnam and Laos in order to make Southeast Asia a zone of peace, stability and cooperation.

The government and people of Kampuchea welcome and fully support the constructive initiatives contained in the statement by Mikhail Gorbachev. We are prepared to cooperate with the U.S.S.R. and with all countries in carrying out these initiatives. It is our firm conviction that much can be achieved by joint effort. The Soviet proposals, which accord with mankind's age-old aspirations for peace and justice, will served the cause of security, good-neighbourliness and cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region.

[Correspondent] What, in your opinion, are the ways to ensure peace and security in the region?

[Hun Sen] As a result of the policy of wars and confrontation pursued by the United States of America and other reactionary forces, the situation in Southeast Asia remains tense. Naturally this worries the three countries of Indo-China. Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have proved their good will by putting forward what we believe to be important proposals aimed at making Southeast Asia a zone of peace, friendship, cooperation and good-neighbourliness. Other convincing manifestations of our good will have been the five partial reductions of the Vietnamese volunteer contingents in Kampuchea at the request of the Kampuchean Government and under a bilateral agreement. These troops will be completely withdrawn from the country by 1990.

The fraternal countries of Indo-China believe that the situation in Kampuchea could be discussed, along with other questions, at negotiations between the Indo-China states and ASEAN. Such negotiations, which Kampuchea, Vietnam and Laos have proposed must certainly center on problems of peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

Reactionary forces, the enemies of Kampuchea have not abandoned their sinister schemes. But there is no bringing back the black times to our revived country. We believe that our cause is just and it is our conviction that realism should prevail in the policy of all the countries of the region. This will pave the way towards much coveted peace and stability.

KADAR INTERVIEWED IN NEW TIMES ON PROGRESS

PM291033 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 41, 20 Oct 86 pp 3-6

[Interview with Janos Kadar, general secretary of the MSZMP, by Vitaliy Ignatenko, chief editor of NEW TIMES: "Boldness, Staunchness, Action"]

[Text] Budapest -- Comrade Janos Kadar gave me an appointment for 11:30.

His office, overlooking the embankment and the serene river, is filled with books. There is a large original portrait of Lenin considering a chess move. Photographs on the walls show historical episodes in the life of the party and its international links. A smaller portrait of Lenin hangs above the general secretary's desk.

Janos Kadar comes into the office. He smiles and shakes hands. His handshake is strong.

"Well, let's get down to business," he motions me to the table. "I'm ready for your questions."

[Ignatenko] Comrade Kadar, you ended your concluding speech at the 13th Congress of the MSZMP by quoting the words Janos Arany, the classic Hungarian poet, used to describe one of his main characters: "The greater the danger the braver he is." If you look at the history of the struggle for socialism in Hungary, to what extent does it reveal this trait in the Hungarian people?

[Kadar] Our great poet formulated the historical experience and aspirations of the people on the eve of the Hungarian bourgeois-democratic revolution and the liberation struggle.

In my concluding address to the congress I quoted his words to remind people of a historical fact: When the situation required it our people and our working class worked and struggled with redoubled energy and boldly took up the cause of national independence and social progress. I wanted to stress that to cope with our domestic and foreign problems what is needed above all is boldness, staunchness and action.

The promulgation of the Hungarian Soviet republic in 1919 was a widely known historical instance of bold action for socialist ideals. This happened at a time when the forces of young Soviet Russia, then being torn by White Guards and the troops of the invaders, were far from our country. From the moment the Hungarian Soviet republic was formed it had to wage a difficult struggle for survival, the preservation of Hungarian sovereignty and the future of the nation. For several months our people successfully withstood political and diplomatic threats, economic pressure and armed intervention, and it was only military force enlisted by the former ruling classes, mobilized and equipped by the Entente powers, that succeeded in defeating the Hungarian Soviet Republic.

Even under the counterrevolutionary regime the finest sons and daughters of our people continued the struggle because they knew that the first Soviet republic in Hungary, which fell, will be followed by a second, which will be victorious. [single quotation mark as received] This was how Lenin characterized the period. Being aware of this, Hungarian patriots and internationalists at home and in many European countries fought against fascism and war for an independent, democratic and free Hungary. The country, plunged into the second world war and exposed to mortal danger through the fault of the ruling class, was liberated as a result of the heroic and selfless struggle of the Soviet army.

After the Nazi occupiers had been driven out of Hungary, our people were able to take their destiny into their own hands. At that period, too, Communists and other patriotic and progressive forces had to tackle formidable problems, for they had inherited a devastated country. Their efforts bore fruit: They managed to establish and strengthen the popular government and mobilize the people to restore the country and build a new social system. As a result of dedicated work we made great advances in the struggle for democratic and socialist goals over a short period.

After several years of progressive development, serious mistakes on the part of the leading group headed by Rakosi and the growing distortions of policy brought the country to crisis in 1953. In 1956 betrayal by the revisionist group headed by Imre Nagy and the actions of internal and external counterrevolutionaries gravely threatened the people's government. Hungarian Communists, Hungarian advocates of socialism, backed by the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, the international communist movement and progressive people everywhere, upheld our constitutional system, restored legality, and created conditions for the further building of socialism.

[Ignatenko] Thirty years ago Western Propaganda claimed that socialism in Hungary was dead. Now more and more often it asks why the republic survived and why it continues to march forward. Of course, they find it hard to admit that Hungary's example is proof of the viability of socialism. They attempt to offer their own explanation: Hungary is doing well because, they say, it is using capitalist methods.

[Kadar] Yes, I am aware of that. But let us go back to those years. When the danger was behind us and the popular government was no longer threatened, the tasks of building socialism again came to the fore. Perseverance and hard work were still needed to solve them. After the consolidation of political power and the social system, the next major challenge in the early 1960's was to finish building the foundations of socialist society and to reorganize agriculture along socialist lines. There were snags along the way as well. We were aware that unless we came to grips with the problem, the fundamental political basis of our state -- the alliance between workers and peasants -- could not be strong and Hungarian agriculture would not be able to meet the country's food needs. If we had mishandled this problem we would have caused grave damage to the unity of the working classes and the country's economic position would have deteriorated.

With active help from all strata of society, the party and the working class -- in the period of the establishment of agricultural cooperatives -- managed to strengthen the foundation of our popular state, i.e., the alliance between workers and peasants, and boost agricultural output. The socialist reorganization of agriculture is a historic achievement of our system. It marks not only a major political step forward but helps considerably raise the living standards of the working class, the peasantry, all the working people, and makes it possible to meet the people's needs. We also have large quantities of goods for export.

In the mid-1960's new major tasks arose before us in the process of socialist development. The sources of extensive growth of the economy having been exhausted, it was necessary to make our system of economic management more flexible and carry out a comprehensive reform. The essence of the management system, in operation for 18 years now, is as follows: a socialist planned economy taking into account the laws of the market, the use of economic as opposed to administrative methods of management, and a certain degree of autonomy and incentive for cooperatives and state-owned enterprises. The experience of recent years has shown that the economic reform introduced in 1968 took into account the general laws of the building of socialism and the specific features of our country and its economic structure, and helped to develop the national economy and consolidate socialist elements in our society.

Among other complex problems we have tackled over the past forty years are: ensuring the unity of the nation for achieving our main objective of building a socialist society, extending socialist democracy, bringing about a dramatic improvement in the living conditions of the people, and big advances in the level of education and quality of life.

Determination, restraint and firm adherence to principle were needed to stand our ground in the international arena. Hungary, as a socialist country, an ally of the U.S.S.R. and a member of the Warsaw Treaty and CEMA, is a link in the socialist community, and as such it occupies a recognized place among nations.

This brief outline of my country's history since liberation cannot of course give a complete picture of how often the firmness of the communists and the dedication and staunchness of the Hungarian people have been put to the test. Looking back over the past forty years, we find more and more proof that if there is a clear goal, and correspondingly firm leadership, if all creative forces are united, then a nation which has become master of its own destiny is able to overcome all its difficulties and attain its historical objectives. It was the reference to the path we have covered and thinking about the goals now facing us that I quoted one of the main characters of Janos Arany.

[Ignatenko] Your party has set new targets for the country's economic development and identified its new forms. What have been the most notable features of the experience of the past year and a half?

[Kadar] In March 1985 the 13th party congress formulated a clear-cut programme for the further building of an advanced socialist society, for revealing and tapping the potential of the socialist system. The congress set the following objective: constantly aware of the need for economic balance, especially the balance of payments and the state budget, commodity stocks and wages, increase effectiveness of the national economy and thus create a basis for raising the people's living standards. Important conditions for a fuller use of the potential of the socialist system are the acceleration of scientific and technological development, efforts to reveal people's creative forces, and the strengthening of the unity and cohesion of the nation by improving democratic institutions.

Since the congress ended we have started to implement its decisions. Unfortunately, it has to be said that as regards the main goal -- accelerated economic development -- we are not pleased with the start that has been or with the present state of affairs. In addition to objective factors -- international economic conditions, a very cold winter in 1985, and the present drought -- we should look for the causes of this in shortcomings in our own work.

While we have not managed to achieve the desired goals in the economy, we have started to carry out the congress decisions in some other important fields. After the congress we held elections to the National Assembly and the local councils under a new electoral law which makes it binding to put up at least two candidates in every constituency. The elections took place in a favourable political atmosphere and have brought positive results. Changes for the better has been achieved in the work of the Trade unions and other bodies representing the interests of the working people.

As part of the effort to improve the system of economic management councils of enterprises have been set up which give them still greater autonomy and responsibility for economic activity. A special law establishes the norms of honest economic activity and obstructs dishonest economic practices. Following the congress decisions, the local councils have become more independent. [paragraph continues]

While the state retains its monopoly over the issue of money and control of currency resources, we have set about creating a banking system that keeps separate the functions of banks of issue, state financing and trade. We hope this will lead to the kind of credit and financial practices which will better serve the purpose of enhancing production activity.

Although the overall economic processes are still not favorable, economic performance has improved in some branches. Many large enterprises have managed to raise output, increase exports and achieve goods results in the use of manpower. We have expanded our multiform cooperation with the Socialist countries. Our economic ties with the Soviet Union are developing dynamically. Between 1986 and 1990 we hope to increase trade between the two countries by 30 per cent.

The Central Committe of the MSZMP and the Government of Hungary have taken a number of measures to meet our economic objectives and targets for this year. These measures serve to develop the production structure, stimulate technical progress and export, provide greater incentives of enterprises and workers to improve economic performance, make better use of working time, and strengthen labour discipline. In every field we attach great significance to the human factor and better lapping of the intellectual and creative potential inherent in society. A fine example is offered by the participation of our specialists in the VEGA space programme, and this also speaks volumes about the potential of science in Hungary.

[Ignatenko] Western propaganda has been rather ingenious in attaching various labels to socialist countries. For example, Hungary has been described as a country of "limited socialism" or "limited pluralism" and sometimes, somewhat indulgently, as a "communist state." It seems to me that you, Comrade General Secretary, have already commented on that by saying: I wish it were so...Unfortunately, this is not yet the case. But we would like it to be the case and we are working towards this end." Is there any need for a further reply!

[Kadar] I think there is. First about our immediate objectives and longer-term prospects. At present we are building an advanced socialist society, with communism as our ultimate goal.

Our party is firmly convinced that the congress decisions are correct and -- given improved work and concentration of effort -- they can be fulfilled to good effect. In our work we can rely on the political maturity and industry of our people. Internationally, our bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the socialist countries provides a solid buffer.

[Ignatenko] Perhaps you are in a better position than anyone else, Comrade Kadar, to trace the progress of the community of free socialist nations. How would you formulate new tasks? And what methods do you think will be useful in solving them?

[Kadar] Since the second world war decisive changes in the world balance of forces have been brought about by the fact that the socialist system, first established in the U.S.S.R. has become a world system.

Another momentous change in recent decades, also linked with the above change, is the collapse of the "classical" colonial system.

The peoples that have freed themselves from the colonial yoke are ever more resolutely opposing the insidious machinations of the imperialists and working to consolidate the independence of their countries and build independent national economies, with more and more of these countries choosing the non-capitalist path of social and economic development.

The social and economic progress of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and the international authority of our community add to the appeal of socialism and provide a reliable bulwark for every progressive and peace-loving movement. I believe therefore that the most important thing for the socialist community at present is that our countries, separately and together, should further reveal the advantages of the socialist system.

Historical experience shows that we should never forget that the socialist community is made up of independent national states. They are linked by the identify of basic goals and interests. This gives strength to proletarian, socialist internationalism. But the system in any given socialist country can only be secure and effective -- and this is one of the main conclusions the Hungarian Communists have drawn -- when the Marxist-Leninist party -- the leading force in society -- makes decisions that simultaneously and equally take into account the general and fundamental laws of socialism and the local conditions and national traditions in the given country. All this is necessary if the masses are to support our goals, if the advantages of the socialist system are to be used fully, and if we are to be reliable partners of our socialist allies and of all the champions of peace.

There is no doubt that each party and each socialist country should formulate the strategy and tactics to solve these tasks in accordance with their own possibilities, but it is also true that it cannot do without the experience of the community of socialist states. The present situation makes it more urgent than ever before for the socialist countries to strengthen their cohesion.

In their foreign and home policies the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party and the Hungarian government seek, in keeping with our common principles and the identity of our main interests and goals, to foster links with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries covering all the important areas of political, economic and social life.

The social and economic progress of the socialist countries and the international authority and influence of our community are inconceivable without the existence of the Soviet Union, the historic achievements of the Soviet Communists and all Soviet people.

We in our country followed with interest and sympathy the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which, in considering new social and economic phenomena and international relations and creatively applying Marxist-Leninist theory, approached the key issues of our era in a new way, stimulating further reflection and action. We are convinced that the acceleration of the Soviet Union's social and economic development and the implementation of the large-scale programme adopted by the congress will not only bring considerable change in the life of the Soviet People, but will give an impetus to the development of other socialist countries.

Not only this country, but the whole world, and all peace-loving people approve and support the foreign policy strategy of the CPSU, which aims at ending the arms race, preventing nuclear war, preserving peace, and solving the global problems on which the survival of mankind depends.

The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, the government of Hungary and our people are convinced supporters of the Soviet foreign policy initiatives, and attach great significance to concerted actions by socialist countries on major issues of world politics. We for our part are doing everything in our power to ensure that our common initiatives in the world arena yield results.

We consider it an honour that Budapest should have been the venue of the meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee last summer and that it was in our capital that it adopted the appeal containing a programme for reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, which would go a long way towards strengthening peace and security in our continent.

One of the key areas of joint work between the socialist countries is economic cooperation. We share a determination to raise our work in this area to a new level meeting higher standards, as recent sessions of CEMA have also shown. One way of achieving this is through broader scientific and technological cooperation and specialization, and the setting up of joing enterprises. The same end will be served by the establishment of direct links between enterprises. A higher level of economic cooperation would offer greater possibilities for the development of the whole community and the individual states it comprises, and strengthen the international economic positions of our countries.

The states that make up the socialist world system embarked on revolutionary transformations at different times and in different historical conditions, starting out from different levels of productive forces. They differ in size of territory and population. Multiform cooperation among the countries of the socialist community has never come automatically. We are convinced, therefore, that contributing towards stronger unity and cooperation by its policies is an important task of the Marxist-Leninist party which guies the building of socialism. It is only if the party constantly and consciously seeks to contribute by its policies to unity and cooperation among socialist countries that it can best serve the twin goals of raising the living standards of its own people and the cause of social progress in the world.

By way of conclusion I can say: we believe that the Hungarian communists and people, the Hungarian People's Republic can contribute to our common cause primarily by successfully tackling the tasks of construction on the agenda in their own country.

Our country and our people are not alone in struggling and working for a peaceful socialist future. We are trying to live up to our role in solving our common tasks because in this way we serve the vital interests of our own people. Making the use of time-tested methods and looking for new opportunities, we will promote cooperation with our Soviet friends and other fraternal socialist countries and pool our efforts in work and the struggle to strengthen peace and international security and solve the global problems facing mankind.

[Ignatenko] On this morning of October 1 all the Hungarian papers carried the news of the agreement on an early meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik. This is good news.

It is in many ways an unusual autumn. September saw the successful conclusion of the Stockholm conference and the Vienna session of the IAEA. Preparations have got under way for the Vienna meeting which will mark the next stage in the Helsinki process. And there seem to be favorable signs at the Geneva negotiations. At the beginning of our talk, Comrade Kadar, we referred to the Hundarian poet Arany. [paragraph continues]

Now I am reminded of Pushkin's "Boldino Autumn." (This phrase is used to denote a particularly fruitful period, like the autumn in Boldino where the poet Pushkin wrote so many masterpieces.) Do you believe there are grounds for talking about a "Boldino Autumn" in internationalist politics?

[Kadar] As far as I remember, the "Boldino Autumn" was the autumn when Pushkin's creative potential was most fully revealed. Certain hopes and perspectives have been generated in international politics today. Responsible political leaders in the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and -- more broadly -- through the world -- sincerely wish international issues to be solved by negotiation, taking into account the interests of all the parties concerned. Accordingly, the leading bodies of the Hungarian People's Republic welcomed the Geneva summit during which the sides made a statement of fundamental importance. They jointly stressed that neither side would seek military superiority, that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and that nuclear war should be prevented. Regrettably, the Geneva summit has not brought notable progress, although the Soviet Union has come out with many sensible proposals, with regard to the interests of both sides. Important proposals, with regard to the interests of both sides. Important proposals and initiatives have also been put forward by the latest meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee. The socialist countries have also taken vigorous steps at various international negotiations, for example, at the current session of the U.N. General Assembly and at meetings within the framework of the European cooperation and security-building process. Would public opinion give its due to the successful conclusion of the Stockholm conference. For our part, we expect a similar conclusion to the Vienna and Geneva negotiations.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States are of particular significance for international politics and it is very important to see progress in their bilateral relations. I am glad that Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan are shortly to meet in Iceland to prepare the schedule for a visit by the CPSU General Secretary to the U.S. I am convinced that all who want durable and secure peace will welcome the summit meeting as a step towards new possibilities in improving the international situation.

TASS CITES DISARMAMENT MESSAGE BY BCP'S ZHIVKOV

LD271955 Moscow TASS in English 1918 GMT 27 Oct 86

[Text] Sofia October 27 TASS -- "The bold and constructive proposals put forward in Reykjavik by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, became the manifestation of a new political thinking corresponding to the realities of the present-day world."

"The USSR's stand will undoubtedly have an effect on the efforts of the governments and peoples of the world aimed at curbing the nuclear-missile arms race, at developing the process of disarmament, and at improving international relations," emphasizes a message of greetings sent by Todor Zhivkov, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), president of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

The message was read out by Dimitur Stanishev, secretary of the BCP Central Committee, at an international symposium which has opened here. The symposium's subject is "nuclear weapons-free zones in Europe."

"The address by the Warsaw Treaty member states to NATO countries on establishing in Europe zones free from nuclear weapons has met with broad support among European and world public."

"These ideas apply to northern Europe and the Balkans, to Central Europe and the Iberian Peninsula," the message says.

"The Soviet Union's readiness to guarantee the status of such zones has had a positive effect on the strengthening of this movement."

"Bulgaria is one of the most active initiators of making the Balkans a zone free from nuclear weapons."

"Availing myself of the opportunity, I want to state once again that Bulgaria is ready immediately to begin to discuss matters related to the realisation of this idea at any time, any place, and at all levels. Of course, we as realists take into account the fact that the idea of establishing nuclear-free zones has opponents."

"This requires still greater purposeful actions on the part of all public forces which, irrespective of their political and ideological affiliation, sincerely strive for stronger peace, security, and better mutual understanding among nations."

"One would like to believe that the Sofia symposium which is being held in the international year of peace will give a new impulse to the idea of establishing zones free from nuclear weapons."

The Bulgarian leader voiced confidence that the forces of reason would prevail over the forces of militarism.

"Security and peace will triumph on earth, our common home," Todor Zhivkov's message of greetings emphasized.

BULGARIAN PAPER INTERVIEWS PRAVDA'S AFANASYEV

AU281459 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 24 Oct 86 pp 1, 3

[Interview given by Viktor Afanasyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee and PRAVDA chief editor, to Radoslav Radev and Ivan Angelov, RABOTNICHESKO DELO representatives, in Sofia; date not given -- first four paragraphs are newspaper's introduction]

[Text] Each of my visits to Bulgaria is a holiday, Viktor Afanasyev says. Your people are not numerous, but the Soviet people accept your achievements as their own, and vice versa.

This time the Chief Editor of PRAVDA, Viktor Grigoriyevich Afanasyev, is visiting Bulgaria in connection with the 10th Congress of the International Organization of Journalists, in whose work he took part as chairman of the leadership of the Union of USSR journalists, leader of the Soviet delegation, and deputy chairman of the International Organization of Journalists.

Viktor Afanasyev is member of the CPSU Central Committee, deputy of the CPSU Supreme Soviet, academician, and author of many books on philosophy, the problems of data processing, and social management.

Radoslav Radev and Ivan Angelov, RABOTNICHESKO DELO representatives, met him and talked with him.

[Radev, Angelov] Let the topic of the party, the Party of the Soviet Communists, be the first topic of our conversation, because it is the main subjective factor in the accelerated socioeconomic development of the USSR and in the process of reconstruction.

[Afanasyev] I am not going to discover America by saying that the CPSU is the leading, organizing, and guiding factor in the USSR. The party is responsible for everything -- for the economy, the political situation, the social situation, and the state of culture. It just so happens that in recent years we have attributed everything to the party. If bread does not reach the stores on time -- the party is responsible. For every little thing, for the drought, for the poor harvest -- it is always the party that is responsible. Somehow we forgot the Leninist truth that we must analyze separately and separate the functions of the party and the state leadership. Recently the party organs have very often been dealing with and solving concrete operational, economic, and other issues. Simultaneously, the issues which the party can solve -- issues related to economic strategy, education, ideology, selection of cadres, and internal and international policy -- are not always being solved by the party organs. We also said this during the precongress discussion, which was a stormy and interesting one, live, and devoid of any staging. We exaggerated some things, overtaxed things a bit, and therefore we were criticized during the congress, and this also included PRAVDA.

However, after the congress we decided to change our work, and we did change it to a large degree, first of all in the area of party topics.

[Radev, Angelov] The journalists of RABOTNICHESKO DELO and all other Bulgarian newspapers and mass media have always turned to PRAVDA's work as a source of valuable professional-political experience. Despite the fact that there is no Bulgarian journalist who does not daily open the pages of PRAVDA, please tell us about the direction of the new changes and the concrete work of PRAVDA's "crew" to facilitate these changes.

[Afanasyev] First of all, we are trying to ask about everything not only the district, city, oblast, and kray party committees, but also the leaderships of the economic and public organizations, because the party cannot do everything by itself, and cannot be everything. True, we overdid it a little bit with the criticism directed against party workers, but afterwards we nevertheless decided that there are many interesting people in the party, people who are working, especially in the "category" of the first secretaries of district committees. This is the party's support. This is where everything is being done: Industry is there, agriculture is there, in short, everything. Therefore we decided to publish an editorial (nobody obliged us, nobody recommended it). "The First Secretary" -- this was the title of the article -- dealt with the role of the first secretary, regardless of his rank, whether at the district, oblast, or republic level. The people liked the article. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev especially called us on this matter. The party workers also liked the article. We received proposals to tell the people about the first secretary. Now the rubric "Party Life: We Tell You About the First Secretaries" is an integral part of the newspaper. We want to present the party as a leading, political, and ideological force, and as a manifestation of the human phenomen. However, there are also regular rank and file party members. Therefore we started a new rubric -- "Living by Their Conscience." This reconstruction which we are now conducting is encountering many difficulties. It is perhaps not as quick as it should be, and it is connected with struggle, I would say, a struggle between the old and the new. Of course, the majority of our people and our party support the course of accelerated socioeconomic development. However, our readers are a bit impatient -- they want us to do away with all shortcomings and mistakes immediately, or tomorrow. We declared war on drinking and alcoholism -- so tomorrow there should not be any! This, however, is no simple thing. The problem cannot be solved immediately.

It is a huge problem which cannot be solved in 2 years or even in a 5-year period, or even in a longer period. In addition, everyone must be responsible for the reconstruction -- from the regular worker to the minister, from the rank and file communist to the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

[Radev, Angelov] You already anticipated our next question -- about the difficult struggle between old and new factors in the process of reconstruction. However, recent party and state documents stress very sharply that the reconstruction is not taking place at the necessary pace. In your opinion what is to be done to eliminate the obstacles to accelerated socioeconomic development?

[Afanasyev] Bureaucracy -- this is our main enemy and the main danger. Lenin once said (I cannot articulate this thought very precisely, nor can I point out the specific page or volume of his writings which contains it), but approximately he said: if socialism perishes (of course, it will never perish!) -- this will be only because of bureaucracy. This is our main enemy.

We have wonderful decisions -- party decisions. They are clear, expressive, timely, and scientifically founded. There are many people -- workers, kolkhoz-members, specialists, engineers, and scientists -- who are burning with the desire to work; however, we must create normal conditions for their work, life, and leisure. They would work on Sundays, Saturdays, and holidays. However, there is a certain part of our apparatus (the state apparatus, and to a lesser degree -- of the party apparatus), which has a different nature. Those are people who sidestep these sensible, serious, and scientifically founded party decisions, translate them into a bookish language, create various instructions, postulates, regulations, and so forth, and in short, act as clerks. And the clerk (in the bureaucratic sense of the word), produces only paper. He does not know how to produce anything else! Therefore, we suffocate under the mass of instructions, decisions get lost there, and ... are not being implemented. Great organizational, ideological, and party work is needed if these decisions are to be implemented.

What are the roads to uprooting bureaucracy? Obviously, one of them is -- to reduce the administrative apparatus. The agrarian industry in our country united all branches related to agrarian production -- distributing, storing, preserving, and even marketing production -- and thus the number of employees was reduced by 45 percent.

We are trying to introduce the two-link system of management in certain branches and ministries, because now we have two, three, four, and in some branches, even five links. Now we are making the first steps to unburden this structure, in other words, the task is to reduce the excessive apparatus and bookishness which prevent people from working.

[Radev, Angelov] What is the role of the Soviet press and journalists in the great work related to implementing this reconstruction?

[Afanasyev] The main task of the press is to discover the new factors and novelties, to find the most valuable frontranking experience, to support it, disseminate it, and turn it into a common cause. We must clearly understand that everyone must join the reconstruction -- from the rank and file communist to the leader. Therefore, our rubric has such a "broad" address: "Living By Their Conscience." But there are also other reasons. Not all cadres are sufficiently prepared for the reconstruction. There are also cadres who are sitting quietly and waiting, convinced that this is a regular campaign which will make some noise and will then stop. Those are people who are sitting on the fence. What shall we do with them? They must either learn and move themselves in the right direction, or be compelled to adjust to the new situation.

Of course, there are also enemies. They are not overt enemies. They do not speak openly, but do what they should not be doing. The party discards them.

The renewal of cadres does not follow the principle of age, but the principle of working ability, businesslike approach, and activity. We are implementing the process of actively promoting a new and educated generation which correctly understands the needs of the present stage -- educated, energetic, and businesslike people. Of course, mistakes could happen, and sometimes not the most suitable cadres emerge, but anyway the process of renewal has begun. If I can return to your question -- the complexity of the work in the newspaper lies in catching all these processes and showing the struggle between the old and the new factors.

At the conference heads of faculties on social sciences, Mikhail Gorbachev very strongly, categorically, and clearly said that we must start from the real dialectics, from life, and from all the contradictions which exist both in our society and in international life. This -- real life -- must also be the starting point of journalistic work. We must grasp the tendencies, look forward, and study real processes, and not quote or operate with statistical data. Mark Twain said of statistics: There is the lie, the big lie, and statistics. We must know what is concealed behind the numbers.

My advice to my PRAVDA colleagues is the following: Study the essence and the tendencies, and penetrate the depths. Do not concentrate on the present, but on the future!

You know that for a long time I have been working in the area of the problems of the managment system. I think that the journalist must have a systematic approach in this work, so that he will be able to take into consideration the entire group of factors in the processes and phenomena about which we are writing. I think that under contemporary conditions the journalist, if he is not a scientist, must in any event be something very close to a scientist.

[Radev, Angelov] One of the main and positive characteristics in the party course is the appeal for broad publicity [glasnost]. Since there has always been publicity concerning positive factors, the problem of publicizing the negative factors now becomes more acute. Do you encounter difficulties in overcoming resistance in some cases which require broad publicity? What is the effectiveness of your activity?

[Afansyev] The root of this problem lies in the activity of the press. The press is more effective when it becomes a tribune of publicity. But how were things until recently? There is an earthquake -- but you cannot write about it. There is a fire -- but you cannot write about it... Now our development has imposed broad publicity, which means that what is true is true, and what is false is false. In other words, the press became more open, problem-oriented, and sharper. (Sharper not because of "pure" sharpness but through finding positive solutions to the problem.) I think that to a certain degree we have succeeded in this respect. Thus, at the initiative of Mikhail Gorbachev we are printing announcements about meetings of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. True, there were cases when we were a bit late -- this is a contradiction connected with information. However, by way of example we immediately published the announcement about the accident of the "Nakhimov." The same applies to the submarine. Now there are simply no forbidden topics. In the past we could not criticize Moscow. Even the city leadership performs self-criticism. We have not coordinated with anybody whom we should criticize or not criticize. I shall repeat: We have no forbidden areas of criticism!

[Radev, Agnelov] What about the effectiveness of the materials published in PRAVDA?

[Afanasyev] The effectiveness has increased. I must say that recently, after the congress, there were about 10 special decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo related to publications in PRAVDA. You have probably seen in PRAVDA the material about the newspaper that closed in Moscow Oblast. It was a very strong and very precise item. And there was a special decision related to it. There was also an interesting article about construction -- "Dissection of Formalism." It dealt with constructors and innovators who introduced a new method of constructing apartments. It saves area and materials. This is the so called "beam method."

In short, our materials are becoming ever more effective. However, we cannot say that everything is in order. In some cases, instead of discussing a problem, they discuss the author of the critical letter and dig into some negligent point of his life. Or they simply transfer the guilty person quietly to another post.

Therefore, increasing the effectiveness of all material published became our main task. This is what the party requires from us. Even if we have to return to the problem for the second or third time -- we must complete our work.

[Radev, Angelov] In this conversation we cannot fail to mention the chief problem of our epoch -- the problem of peace and war -- especially following the Reykjavik meeting. We are acquainted with the evaluation of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and with Mikhail Gorbachev's statements. You are an optimist as an individual, are you also an optimist as regards the global mutual relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, since the world atmosphere and the future of the globe depend upon these relations?

[Afanasyev] I am an optimist as a question of principle. However, as to the great hope regarding the question of whether the problem of "Star Wars" will be resolved in the near future and whether we will agree on this problem, I must admit that I have no hope. Why is this so? Because, first of all, Reagan is not free to adopt a decision, he depends upon the military-industrial complex and the military-industrial complex dictates everything to him. Despite the fact that there is talk about it, I would once more like to stress that the military-industrial complex has tremendous power in the United States.

In the second place, they wish to create great economic difficulties for us, both for the Soviet Union and for our allies, they are trying to force us to get involved in the arms race, to exhaust us, and to prevent us from implementing our domestic program -- the economic, social, and cultural programs of our countries.

This, however, is an illusion.

The third reason "why" is the following: This idea, this mania about achieving military strategic superiority over the Soviet Union and over the Warsaw Pact member-countries has once again taken possession of the Americans. In the past they used to order people about in all things and in all places; later they lost their commanding positions, and were depressed by the so-called "Vietnam syndrome." Now all this is over, and they are again possessed by the idea of neo-globalism, striving to order about everyone and everything. Perhaps they think that we are weak and helpless, incapable of resisting such ideas.

The three factors explain why Reagan has embraced the "Star Wars" system as if it were his favorite child. However, other factors exist -- for example the American people, the peoples struggling for peace; there is public opinion and, last but not least, there is Europe, which is very concerned about the results of Reyjkavik.

Reykjavik showed that even the most complicated problems -- the questions of disarmament, of eliminating nuclear weapons -- can be resolved on a political platform. Despite the fact that no concrete agreements were reached in Reykjavik, this was a meeting of great historic importance not only for Soviet-American relations, but for the whole system of international relations. It proved that a way out can be found, that it is possible to reach an agreement. There is a basis for this, there are possibilities.

[Radev, Angelov] When, do you think, can a meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan be held in Washington?

[Afanasyev] I cannot answer this question. Because I really do not know. I think however, that such a meeting is impossible in the near future. What should they talk about? Should Reykjavik be repeated? Therefore it is necessary to create a basis, some sort of progress on the American side is needed.

When will this meeting take place? I do not know, I did no know about Reykjavik, either, although generally speaking I am well informed.

[Radev, Angelov] You have come here as leader of the Soviet delegation to the IOJ Congress. The congress concluded its work. How would you describe your opinion of its work and the work of the organization?

[Afanasyev] This was a most representative congress -- 121 countries were represented here; 400 delegates, observers, and guests attended. They were people with different political, philosophical, and ideological views, and approaches. However, they were unanimous as regards their aspirations to preserve peace. Neither at the plenary sessions, nor within the working groups was there even the tiniest voice of dissent, of deviation from the common ideas. In this context we can define the congress as an important event in the worldwide field of journalism. Naturally, this congress will contribute to the cohesion of the efforts of democratic journalists in solving the main problem -- the problem of peace and war -- to the advantage of peace.

[Radev, Angelov] Let us close our interview with one last question: How would you describe the role of journalists in our contemporary world?

[Afanasyev] The journalists stand in the front ranks. They are obliged to be half-a-step ahead of their time. We are the exponents of information. As a philosopher I place information and data processing [informatika] in the same category. This is all the more true since, in our technological century when information can be instantly transmitted and propagated, this represents a particular responsiblity. This is why we must struggle for truthful information, this is why we have to resist the "information imperialism" which oppresses the developing countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa in particular. We are obliged to struggle for a new information order, where every nation, big or small, can say for itself whatever it wishes to say. Journalists can greatly contribute to this. As to our Soviet journalism, as to our press, we have never exerted such influence as today, we have never played such a great role as today. We must add that our mass media have never been treated with so much attention by our country's and party's leadership, as well as by the entire Soviet people as is the case today.

BULGARIAN OFFICIALS MEET WITH PRAVDA'S AFANASYEV

AU271219 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 24 Oct 86 p 3

[Text] On 23 October Yordan Yotov, member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo, Central Committee secretary and RABOTNICHESKO DELO chief editor, and Milko Balev, member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo and Central Committee secretary, received Viktor Afanasyev, deputy chairman of the International Organization of Journalists, chairman of the Leadership of the Union of Soviet Journalists, and PRAVDA chief editor, who took part in the 10th Congress of the International Organization of Journalists.

The Soviet quest was briefed on the work of the Bulgarian Communists and working people in putting into effect the decisions of the 13th BCP Congress, and on the BCP activity in implementing the peace-loving foreign policy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in the Balkans, Europe, and the world.

Viktor Afanasyev spoke about the activity of Soviet journalists in the struggle to implement in life the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the USSR's peaceful initiatives against the nuclear threat and for protecting and strengthening peace.

During the talk, which took place in a cordial and friendly atmosphere, issues were discussed related to the joint work of the mass media of the two countries in reflecting the course of comprehensive cooperation and coming together between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the USSR, and in propagating the complex of Soviet peace proposals made at the Reykjavik meeting.

KORCAK-LED DELEGATION VISITS KIRGIZ SSR

Received by CP Officials

AU231644 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 22 Oct 86 p 7

[CTK report: "Days of Czechoslovak Economy and Technology"]

[Text] Frunze -- Josef Korcak, head of a Czechoslovak Government delegation, member of the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium, CSSR deputy premier, and premier of the Czech Socialist Republic, opened the "Days of Czechoslovak Economy and Technology" in Frunze, capital of the Kirgiz USSR, yesterday. From the Kirgiz side, the inauguration was attended by Nikolay Semenov, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kirgizia, and other party, government, and public officials. The objective of the "Days of Czechoslovak Economy and Technology" is to familiarize the population of that Soviet republic with the specific results of Czechoslovak economy, science, and technology. The Czechoslovak Government delegation was received yesterday by Absamat Masaliyev, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kirgizia, and other representatives. The delegation also visited the Museum of V.I. Lenin, laid bouquets on the V.I. Lenin and "Victory" memorials, and Josef Korcak planted a Tien Shan fir in the "Alley of Friendship."

Departs From Frunze

LD250234 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 2200 GMT 24 Oct 86

[Text] The Soviet Union -- The Czechoslovak Government delegation headed by Josef Korcak, member of the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium, deputy federal premier, and Czech premier ended its official visit in Kirghizia and left Frunze for home today.

The delegation attended in Frunze the opening of the days of Czechoslovak Economy and Technology and had talks with leading Kirghizian officials. Josef Korcak, when talking to journalists, voiced the conviction that the visit to Frunze by the government delegation and the Days of Czechoslovak Economy and Technology would be followed by further contacts in the political and economic sphere.

Comments on 'Problems'

AU282217 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 27 Oct 86 p 4

[CTK report: "About Successes, as Well as About Problems"]

[Text] Moscow (CTK correspondent) -- Josef Korcak, CPCZ Central Committee Presidium member, CSSR's deputy premier, and premier of the Czech SR, who had taken part in the Days of Czechoslovak Economy and Technology in Frunze, pointed out in his talk with the journalists [date and place not given] the firm relations of friendship and fraternal cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Kirghizia. We conducted mutual briefings with the leading representatives of the Communist Party of Kirghizia and the Government of the Kirghiz SSR on the fulfillment of conclusions adopted by the congresses of our fraternal communist parties, J. Korcak stated. We frankly discussed both the achieved successes, and the problems we are resolving in both our countries. We also exchanged experience in party work.

GDR'S STOPH, FINLAND'S PYSTYNEN URGE WEAPON CUTS

LD310653 Moscow TASS in English 0650 GMT 31 Oct 86

[Text] Berlin October 31 TASS -- Meeting in Berlin, Willi Stoph, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic, and Erkki Pystynen, chairman of the Parliament of Finland, have agreed that the overriding need of the times is to achieve drastic cuts in nuclear weapons and ultimately to eliminate them altogether, prevent outer space militarization and put an end to all nuclear testing.

They called for a responsible and constructive approach to meeting this need and pointed as an example to follow the stand of the Soviet Union, which has been demonstrated at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

NUCLEAR PLANT AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH GDR

LD301817 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1750 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow, 30 Oct (TASS) -- Talks were concluded and an agreement signed in Moscow today between the USSR and GDR governments on cooperation in constructing the second stage of the Stendal nuclear power station in the GDR.

SOKOLOV GREETS ROMANIAN COUNTERPART MILEA

PM291134 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Oct 86 Second Edition p 1

[Message from USSR Defense Minister S. Sokolov to Romanian National Defense Minister V. Milea on Romanian Army Day]

[Text] To Colonel General Comrade V. Milea, Romanian minister of national defense.

Esteemed Comrade Minister!

On behalf of the USSR Armed Forces and on my own account I cordially congratulate you and all Romanian servicemen on the 42d anniversary of the Army of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

I wish you and the servicemen of the Romanian Army new successes in military labor for the sake of strengthening the defense capability of your socialist motherland and the fraternal alliance of the Warsaw Pact states, and I express confidence that Soviet-Romanian combat collaboration will steadily develop and strengthen in the interests of our peoples and the cause of peace and socialism.

With communist greetings,

S. Sokolov, Marshal of the Soviet Union, USSR defense minister.

MURAKHOVSKIY RECEIVES ROMANIAN MINISTER

LD301939 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] Murakhovskiy, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Agro-Industrial Committee, received today David, candidate member of the Politispolkom of the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee and minister of agriculture of the Socialist Republic of Romania. He is visiting our country at the invitation of the USSR State Agro-Industrial Committee. In a conversation he was informed about the work for improving the economic mechanism of management in the country's agro-industrial complex. Opinions were exchanged on the issues of expanding and deepening scientific-technical and economic cooperation.

DEMICHEV RECEIVES HUNGARY'S POZSGAY 29 OCT

LD292354 Budapest MTI in English 2212 GMT 29 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow, October 29 (MTI) -- Wednesday in Moscow, Petr Demichev, candidate member of the Political Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee and first vice-chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, met Imre Pozsgay, general secretary of the National Council of the Hungarian Patriotic People's Front. Imre Pozsgay arrived in the Soviet Union on the invitation of the Federation of Soviet Societies of Foreign Friendship and Cultural Relations.

Present at the cordial and warm meeting was Sandor Rajnai, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Hungary to the Soviet Union.

MINISTRY SPOKESMAN CONDEMNS UK FALKLANDS DECISION

LD301447 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1426 GMT 30 Oct 86

["USSR Condemns London's Unilateral Action" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 30 Oct (TASS) -- In connection with the question put by the correspondent of London's THE TIMES newspaper on the Soviet Union's attitude to the 150-mile "protection zone" declared by the British Government around the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands, a representative of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated at a briefing held today at the Foreign Ministry Press Center: It is a cause for regret that the British side has taken unilateral steps that run contrary to the UN decision in regard to these islands. England has done nothing to carry out this decision and is only hampering its implementation with its unilateral actions.

PENTAGON, CIA PLAN TRAINING FOR 'SOMOCISTAS'

LD281335 Moscow TASS in English 1226 GMT 28 Oct 86

[Text] Washington October 28 TASS -- TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko reports:

The Pentagon and the CIA are planning to set up in U.S. territory military camps to train Somocistas used by the USA in a proxy war against Nicaragua.

THE WASHINGTON POST reports that, trying to keep the plan secret, the administration had ordered the Pentagon to find quiet locations in U.S. territory for contra bases. However, U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger said that possible steps to this effect should not surprise anyone because the USA used to train at bases in national territory armymen from Honduras, El Salvador and other countries at the request of their governments. An official spokesman for the U.S. Department of Defence, Robert Sims, has announced that Weinberger personally approved a contra training programme.

White House Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes noted at a briefing in the White House that American legislation did not forbid contra training in U.S. territory.

There is every indication that the United States has decided to escalate its "covert" war against Nicaragua and plans the direct involvement of American troops in it. It is most probably for this purpose that the administration socked Congress for 100 million dollars in contra aid in fiscal 1987. U.S. Air Force overflights of Nicaraguan territory have become more frequent. It follows from evidence given by CIA Agent Eugene Hasenfus, whose plane was recently shot down over Nicaraguan territory, that U.S. Vice President George Bush is coordinating the operations of a secret "task group" concerned with Central American affairs. The decision to set up military training camps for contras in U.S. territory is another development in the escalation of U.S. aggressive policy on Nicaragua.

12 ESTONIANS DRAFTED FOR CHERNOBYL CLEANUP 'SHOT'

AU301711 Paris AFP in English 1705 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] Stockholm, Oct 30 (AFP) -- Twelve persons from the Soviet Republic of Estonia, forced by the Soviet authorities to take part in clearing-up work in the Chernobyl region, were shot dead by soldiers last June, the Estonian refugees' Committee of Solidarity said here Thursday.

Ants Kippar, chairman of the Swedish committee, told a press conference that according to what he called highly reliable sources the 12 Estonians were shot dead during a protest strike.

He said the strike, which involved 300 workers mobilised for the job, had started late in June as a result of the Soviet authorities' decision to prolong the mobilisation period, "initially planned to last two months," by four months.

According to a report reaching Stockholm from an Estonian reserve army lieutenant of Swedish origin, Gunnar Hagelberg, the persons mobilised for the work -- which consisted of clearing rubble in the wake of the reactor disaster and replacing it with fresh earth, as well as washing houses and trees -- were forced to work 14 hours a day, only granted two days off per month, and housed under canvas.

Quoting an Estonian anti-Soviet resistance committee, Mr Kippar said that some 4,000 Estonians were mobilised during the night of May 7, a fortnight after the Chernobyl disaster, to work in the Chernobyl region. They were mainly doctors, taxi drivers, and drivers of tractors and public transport.

Mr Kippar said that of the 4,000 forced to go to Chernobyl, "a large number died victims of radiation following the reactor accident." He was not able, however, to give precise figures. He said doctors had to abort "en masse" pregnant women living in a 30-kilometre (about 20-mile) zone around Chernobyl. The accident had also resulted in a marked increase in stillborn children, as well as a flareup in disease, he said.

The food situation in the area deteriorated badly in July, he said, with the Estonians having difficulty in procuring butter, cream, and meat, foodstuffs that had to be rushed to Chernobyl.

A total of 3,000 Ukrainians and Belorussians were evacuated at the beginning of summer to Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, he added, and their mortality rate has remained high since their arrival in the region.

Further Report

LD301652 Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish 1545 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] An Estonian organization reports today that the Soviet Union has executed 12 Estonians who has been forcibly recruited for clear-up work after the Chernobyl disaster. The Estonians are said to have been shot after they refused to work, reports this organization, called the Aid Center for POlitical Prisoners in Estonia. Ants Kippar represents the Center.

[Begin recording] [Kippar] Yes, these reports are correct, for they have all come from the Estonian resistance movement. The Estonian resistance movement has not given any erroneous information during the 8 years that I have had contacts with the freedom fighters in Estonia.

[Reporter] You have received the information from one quarter, not...

[Kippar, interrupting] I have this information from several quarters, not only from one quarter.

[Reporter] This information is contained, among other things, in documents, which have been secretly filmed in the Soviet Union and then sent to the West by the Estonian resistance movement, says Ants Kippar. The information is part of a more extensive report by the resistance movement in Estonia, which has been sent to, among others, the European security conference soon to open in Vienna. It is reported that the 12, who were executed, were included in a group of 300 Estonians, doctors, tractor drivers, welders, and other similar professional groups, who, after having been forcibly deported to the Chernobyl area, refused to go into the worst contaminated buildings for a second time. Ants Kippar thinks that what has happened is alarming.

[Kippar] I think that what has happened is dreadful, and the people in Estonia are very frightened by it all [pauses] and ask the West to help as much as they can, because the last and most dangerous thing, in the view of the resistance movement, is a new secret decree that all dissidents can be sent straight to Siberia, without any trial or anything, to forced labor there. [end recording]

That was stated by Ants Kippar who represents the Aid Center for Political Prisoners in Estonia. The reporter was (?Thomas Eggers).

NOVOSTI CHIEF INTERVIEWED ON DOMESTIC REFORMS

AU301622 Vienna KURIER in German 30 Oct 86 p 5

["Exclusive" interview given by Valentin Falin, CPSU Central Committee member and chief of the NOVOSTI press agency, to KURIER reporter Heinz Nussbaumer in Moscow; date not specified]

[Text] KURIER: Where is the Soviet Union heading under men such as Gorbachev and Falin?

Falin: We finally want to overcome the discrepancy between words and deeds in this country. Jesus Christ said 2,000 years ago: ''Do not kill, do not lie''. Who still cares about that?

KURIER: Have I understood the parallel correctly: Nothing much has thus been left of Marxism?

Falin: Let us say we have hit limits which have often not only been material, but also human.

KURIER: Is this a tacit admission that your Soviet system is ultimately producing the wrong people?

Falin: Through enormous efforts we have produced the best-educated people. Then, certainly under pressure from outside, we have all too often tried to keep these Soviet people away from daily politics and from sharing responsibility. That was wrong. For Lenin the matter was still clear: The party was the nation's political leader -- a role which was not to be confused with the function of purely governing. The question of existence or non-existence during World War II blurred this dividing line.

KURIER: What does this mean in detail?

Falin: The party has always said: ''Everything needs to be developed. Everything that is right today can already be wrong tomorrow.'' In this sense the ideology was correct. But often the implementation was wrong, the methods used were wrong. Many ideas were considered dogmas for too long. If you consider that as ideology, then it was wrong. Frankly, I myself -- and not only I said at a certain point: ''Actually I no longer want to involve myself with politics.'' I wanted to work more for science and also do something that would yield satisfying results.

KURIER: When was your frustration greatest?

Falin: That was at the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties, when it became clear that one could no longer continue with the old methods, could no longer use them to think ahead and to live. Reforms were just around the corner. It was only due to personnel reasons that they did not meet with a political response.

KURIER: That was the late Brezhnev era?

Falin: At this time Brezhnev's state of health was no longer the best and his successors, too, were no longer physically strong. Andropov certainly had good ideas but unfortunately he became general secretary 5 years too late. At this time he had already lost the battle against his own body. Partly this is one of our nation's traditions: As long as the gods live they are immortal.

KURIER: Gorbachev now speaks about "democratization". What does this mean in the Soviet system? What has to be changed?

Falin: This means that we can no longer lead the economy with directives and decrees. This means that we have to disentangle our bureaucratic system: At present we are in the middle of a process which, in the end, is to retain only one-tenth of the existing decrees. This means that we have to motivate the people toward flexible thinking and sharing responsibility. Gorbachev repeats again and again: ''Soviet man, tell us where the shoe pinches. Tell us about your proposals. Join in!'' We have to find forms and structures in order to ensure the citizen's personal interest in the success of his work and also in the turnover of his enterprise. The larger the turnover, the larger the salary.

KURIER: It was not possible to increase productivity with praise and medals alone?

Falin: That has always been clear. Even Lenin was against this equalization! He considered it an antisocialist method. All this was unfortunately established when rule by decree was tried, so to speak. Over the decades a special group of society evolved in our country, which only lived off this bureaucratic burden. They are the guardians of these mostly unnecessary instructions which guarantee them a comfortable life. It was not the case that we did not have any organizations where problems could be discussed and new ideas could be expressed. [paragraph continues]

Millions of people were "active," at least at the organizational level. But the most important questions were eventually discussed only in a formal manner, as a duty. People spoke and discussed matters, but nothing came out of it.

KURIER: How did this problem arise?

Falin: This is the result of the deplorable state of affairs in our country during the thirties (under Stalin -- the editors). At that time words were too dangerous. Therefore, many people preferred not to say anything or to say only the things that pleased the authorities. The legacy of that time will be with us for rather a long time to come.

KURIER: But even today no Soviet citizen knows whether the party will still want criticism in 10 years -- or whether people then will be made to pay again . . .

Falin: No, I do not accept that. With their minds the people have known for quite some time that all this is past. But the memory of the heart remembers things much longer. Therefore, many of them still keep quiet.

KURIER: But even now there are no clear criticism and censorship limits . .

Falin: Well, Western correspondents today no longer have to meet with dissidents in order to know what is criticized in this country: Everything is in the papers.

KURIER: But only when a certain topic has already been criticized by the party leader. . .

Falin: No, not at all. Very often the article comes first and then the party reacts! Concerning censorship, it has now been made clear that if there are no military secrets then there must not be any censorship either -- then it is the chief editor's sole responsibility to publish an article. No one from the group of censors is permitted to tell me: "This article does not conform to the party line." The only duty and the only right of these people is to guard military secrets!

KURIER: That means the limits of criticism apply only to criticism of the communist system?

Falin: The principles of Marxism-Leninism are the only sacred thing. Everything else can be discussed -- and is discussed -- for instance, whether we should try the Hungarian or the Chinese model in our economy. Our economic magazines are full of that.

KURIER: It is said that Gorbachev's policy of reform is also opposed in his country.

Falin: There is opposition in the sense that people say yes to an innovation and then do the opposite, this is the worst thing! I do not call open discussions opposition. On the contrary, it would be abnormal if all people were to think the same. Therefore, at present, we have not only pros, but also very difficult cons. I myself was and an witness to very tough talks.

KURIER: It is said that the opposition comes from the bureaucratic middle echelons who fear for their power, but also from the army. . .

Falin: Well, if somebody openly expresses his reservations, as was done by (Chief of the General Staff) Akhromeyev, then this should be considered normal. When somebody proposed we should have so-and-so many missiles and then the party leadership proposes a total renunciation of missiles, it is understandable if somebody furiously asks: "Why? I might know much more about these things!" But believe me, it is particularly the military that understands discipline.

KURIER: If there is opposition, might a party leader not tend to play a bit on the personality cult again?

Falin: No, no, that is past, that is illegal. Everyone knows how much depends on the dynamic nature of our general secretary and on the freshness of his thinking. But personal superlatives in propaganda -- no, that we have left far behind us. Thank God!

MOLDAVIAN CP PLENUM DISMISSES OFFICIALS

PM301359 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 23 Oct 86 p 1

[Unattributed "Information Report on Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] A Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum was held in Kishinev 22 October. First secretaries of party raykoms, leaders of republic ministries and departments and the mass media, and chairman of soviet gorispolkoms and rayispolkoms not belonging to the Central Committee were invited to attend.

A report "On the Republic Party Organization's Tasks Stemming From the CPSU Central Committee Resolution 'On the Unsatisfactory Fulfillment of the CPSU Central Committee Decisions on Eradicating Misrepresentation and Overreporting by the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, the Kirovograd Ukrainian Communist Party Obkom, and the USSR Ministry of the Automotive Industry'" was delivered by S.K. Grossu, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee. (The report will be published in the press.)

Speakers in the debates were: N.A. Tsyu, first secretary of Kishinev party gorkom; I.P. Kalin, chairman of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers; I.N. Russu, first secretary of Slobodzeyskiy party raykom; A.A. Mokanu, chairman of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; G.N. Shimanskiy, first secretary of Chimishliyskiy party raykom; I.S. Pavlov, leader of a comprehensive team of grinders at the Tiraspol "Elektromash" plant; A.N. Sangeli, first secretary of Dondyushanskiy party raykom; V.V. Kacherovskaya, operator at the "Put Lenina" interfarm beef production and heifer raising enterprise in Kamenskiy rayon; V.V. Runkovskiy, first secretary of Novoanenskiy party raykom; G.I. Yeremey, chairman of the Moldavian Republic Trade Union Council; V.I. Glebov, first secretary of Tarakliyskiy party raykom; P.V. Voronin, chairman of the Moldavian SSR People's Control Committee; V.N. Bumbak, leader of a field crop cultivation team at the "Put Ilicha" Sovkhoz in Ryshkanskiy Rayon; K.A. Melnik, chairman of the board of the Moldavian Potrebsoyuz; V.M. Iovv, first secretary of Beltsy party gorkom; Ye.P. Kalenik, first deputy chairman of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers; G.I. Lavranchuk, Moldavian SSR minister of internal affairs; A.I. Aleksey, first secretary of Teleneshtskiy party raykom; M.M. Garshtya, general director of Kishinev's "Volna" Production Association named for K.U. Chernenko; N.I. Uzun, Moldavian SSR minister of construction; I.I. Cheban, Moldavian SSR prosecutor; and I.K. Serbin, first secretary of Glodyanskiy party raykom. (The speeches will be published in the press.)

The Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum unanimously adopted a resolution on the question under discussion.

The plenum examined organizational questions.

The plenum relieved P.P. Petrik of his duties as secretary and member of the Bureau of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee in connection with his transfer to other work.

The plenum elected N.F. Bondarchuk, formerly first secretary of Bendery Moldavian Communist Party Gorkom and recently instructor of the CPSU Central Committee Party Organizational Work Section, secretary and member of the Bureau of the Modavian Communist Party Central Committee.

The plenum relieved K.A. Melnik of his duties as chief of a section of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee.

The plenum approved the appointment of A.I. Tsurkanu as chief of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee.

The plenum approved the appointment of A.I. Tsurkanu as chief of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Agriculture and Food Industry Section and the appointment of P.G. Dubalar as chief of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Trade and Consumer Service Section.

The plenum stripped A.F. Zazimko and A.S. Miron of their rank as condidate members of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee for failing to ensure the fulfillment of the CPSU Central Committee's demands with regard to resolutely eradicating overreporting, misrepresentation, and other abuses, lack of control, and personal irresponsibilty.

The closing speech at the plenum was delivered by S.K. Grossu, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee.

Taking part in the plenum's work was G.A. Shipilov, executive of the CPSU Central Committees.

LATVIAN CP INVESTIGATES RIVER BRIDGE ACCIDENT

LD292133 Moscow World Service in English 2100 GMT 29 Oct 86

[Text] The Buro of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Latvia has looked into the causes of the breakdown of a bridge across the Daugava river and issues related to the responsibility of the accident. There were casualties. A group of officals who failed to enforce strict compliance with safety rules have been called to account by the party. The Procurator's Office in Latvia has launched an inquiry into the accident.

GOVERNMENT OUTLINES PLAN FOR 1986-90 LEGISLATION

WA231854 Moscow VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SOYUZA SOVETSKIKH SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH RESPUBLIK in Russian No 37, 10 Sep 86

[Text] USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers Decree

782. Preparation of legislative enactments of the USSR, decrees of the USSR Government and proposals pertaining to an improvement of USSR legislation for 1986-1990

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers resolves:

To confirm the plan of preparation of legislative enactments of the USSR, decrees of the USSR Government and proposals pertaining to an improvement of USSR legislation for 1986-1990 (attached).

A. Gromyko, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

N. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Moscow, The Kremlin, 28 August 1986. No 5562-XI-1051.

Supplement to USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers decree of 28 August 1986 No 5562-XI-1051

Plan of the preparation of legislative enactments of the USSR, decrees of the USSR Government and proposals for an improvement of USSR legislation for 1986-1990

I. Legislation pertaining to the further development of socialist democracy, socialist self-management and the rights and freedoms of the citizens

1. USSR law on the procedure of nationwide discussion of and voting on important questions of the life of the country and also public discussion of draft decisions of the local soviets.

USSR Ministry of Justice [Footnote: Ministries, state committees, and departments of the USSR prepare draft enactments following coordination with other interested ministries, state committees, and departments of the USSR and, if necessary, with the union republic councils of ministers]
AUCCTU
Komsomol Central Committee
USSR Prosecutor's Office. 1987

2. USSR law on the press and information.

USSR Journalists Union
USSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade
USSR Ministry of Justice. Fourth quarter of 1986

3. Legislative instruments on an enhancement of the role of meetings of workers and employees and the broadening of the range of issues on which the decisions of the workforce are final and on the creation at enterprise level of workforce councils and a gradual expansion of the electivity of certain categories of enterprise executives.

AUCCTU
USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems
USSR Ministry of Justice. Second quarter of 1987

4. Legislative instruments on a broadening of the range of questions which may be decided by the state authorities only given the participation or with the prior consent of the appropriate social organizations and also on the granting to these organizations of the right in a number of instances to suspend the implementation of managerial decisions.

USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems
AUCCTU
USSR Ministry of Justice. 1986-1987

5. USSR law on individual labor activity.

USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems
AUCCTU
USSR Ministry of Justice
USSR Ministry of Trade
Tsentrosoyuz
USSR Gosplan
USSR Prosecutor's Office
USSR Supreme Court
USSR Ministry of Finance
USSR MVD
USSR Academy of Sciences. Latter half of 1986

6. USSR law on judicial appeal against the unlawful actions of officials infringing the rights of the citizen.

USSR Ministry of Justice
USSR Supreme Court
USSR Prosecutor's Office
USSR MVD. First quarter of 1987

7. Proposals concerning changes to legislation on the allocation of accommodations and payment therefore depending on the dimensions and quality of the entire occupied area.

AUCCTU
USSR Ministry of Finance
USSR Gosplan
USSR Ministry of Justice
USSR State Committee for Prices
USSR Prosecutor's Office. 1987

II. Legislation pertaining to an improvement of the economic mechanism and management of the economy

8. USSR law on the socialist enterprise (association).

USSR Gosplan
USSR Gossnab
USSR State Committee for Science and Technology
USSR Ministry of Finance
USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems
USSR State Committee for Prices
USSR Gosbank
USSR Stroybank
USSR Ministry of Justice. Latter half of 1986

9. USSR law on nuclear power engineering.

USSR State Committee for Science and Technology
USSR State Committee for the Use of Nuclear Power
USSR Ministry of Nuclear Power and Electrification (Minatomenegro)
USSR State Committee for Safety in Atomic Power Industry
USSR Ministry of Health
USSR Gosplan
AUCCTU
USSR MVD
USSR Ministry of Justice
USSR Academy of Sciences. First half of 1987

10. Proposals concerning changes to legislation geared to an improvement of the system of material-technical supply and an enhancement of the role and responsibility of the USSR Gossnab and its local authorities for the uninterrupted provision of the economy with material resources and their efficient use.

USSR Gossnab
USSR Gosplan
USSR Ministry of Finance. Fourth quarter of 1986

11. Proposals concerning an improvement of legislation on the use of secondary resources in the economy.

USSR Gossnab
USSR Gosplan
USSR State Committee for Science and Technology. First quarter of 1987

12. Proposals concerning changes to legislation for the purpose of improving the work of statistics.

USSR Central Statistical Administration
USSR Gosplan
USSR Ministry of Finance
USSR Gossnab. First quarter of 1987

13. Proposals pertaining to legislative support for the plan-oriented reorganization of the pricing system in the light of the instructions of the 27th CPSU Congress.

USSR State Committee for Prices
USSR Gosplan
USSR Ministry of Finance
AUCCTU. Fourth quarter of 1986

14. General regulations governing USSR ministries.

USSR State Committee for Science and Technology
USSR Gosplan
USSR Gossnab
USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems
AUCCTU
USSR Ministry of Finance
USSR Ministry of Justice. Fourth quarter of 1986

15. General regulations governing USSR state committees.

USSR Ministry of Justice
USSR Gosplan
USSR Gossnab
USSR State Committee for Science and Technology
USSR Gosstroy
USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems
AUCCTU
USSR Academy of Sciences. Latter half of 1987

16. Regulations governing intersectoral production and industrial-trading associations in respect of the manufacture and sale of light industry commodities.

USSR Gosplan
USSR Ministry of Light Industry
USSR Ministry of Trade
USSR Ministry of Finance
USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems. Latter half of 1986

17. Proposals pertaining to an improvement of legislation for the purpose of the further introduction of economic management methods, a significant broadening of the independence of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, their increased interest in and responsibility for the results of economic activity and the extensive development of the group contract based on true cost accounting with the transition ultimately of all enterprises of the agro-industrial complex to self-support and self-financing.

USSR State Agro-Industrial Committee
USSR Gosplan
USSR Ministry of Finance
USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems
USSR Gosbank
AUCCTU. 1986-1987

18. Legislative enactment on changes and additions to the Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the USSR and the union republics.

USSR Ministry of Justice
USSR State Arbitration Commission
USSR Prosecutor's Office
USSR Supreme Court
USSR State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries
All-Union Copyright Agency
USSR Academy of Sciences. First half of 1990

19. Legislative instruments determining the mutual relations of service organizations and clients and enterprises of industry, trade, and other sectors of the economy.

RSFSR Ministry of Consumer Service
USSR Gosplan
USSR Ministry of Finance
USSR Minister of Justice. Latter half of 1987

III. Legislation pertaining to an acceleration of science and technology progress

20. USSR law on product quality.

USSR State Committee for Science and Technology
USSR State Committee for Standards
AUCCTU
USSR State Arbitration Commission
USSR Ministry of Trade
USSR Ministry of Justice. First quarter of 1987

21. USSR law on discoveries, inventions, and licenses.

USSR State Commission for Science and Technology
USSR State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries
AUCCTU
USSR Academy of Sciences
USSR Ministry of Justice. Latter half of 1987

22. Regulations governing the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology.

USSR State Committee for Science and Technology
USSR Gosplan
USSR Academy of Sciences. Fourth quarter of 1986

IV. Legislation on capital construction

23. USSR Council of Ministers decree on the procedure for the planning of the capital investments and confirmation of the itemized lists of construction projects.

USSR Gosplan
USSR Gosstroy
USSR Stroybank
USSR Minister of Justice. Fourth quarter of 1989

24. Rules of financing and the extension of credit for construction.

USSR Stroybank
USSR Ministry of Justice
USSR Gosbank
USSR Ministry of Finance
USSR Gosstroy
USSR Gosplan
USSR Gossnab. First quarter of 1988

25. Rules governing agreements of a contract for capital construction.

USSR Gosstroy
USSR Gosplan
USSR Stroybank
USSR Gosbank
USSR Ministry of Justice. Fourth quarter of 1986

26. Rules governing agreements of a contract for major repairs to buildings and installations.

USSR Gosstroy
USSR Gosplan
USSR State Arbitration Committee
USSR Stroybank
USSR Ministry of Finance
USSR Gosbank
USSR Ministry of Justice. Fourth quarter of 1988

V. Legislation on transport and communications

27. Proposals concerning changes to legislation aimed at perfecting the management of transport sectors, improving the coordination of the operation of all forms thereof, and creating a uniform legal system and tariff policy.

USSR Gosplan
USSR Ministry of Railways
USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation
USSR Ministry of Maritime Fleet
RSFSR Council of Ministers
RSFSR Ministry of River Fleet
USSR State Committee for Prices. Third quarter 1986

28. USSR communication statutes.

USSR Ministry of Communications
USSR Ministry of Justice. First half of 1988

VI. Legislation on nature conservation and the rational use of natural resources

29. Proposals concerning an improvement of legislation for a further strengthening of nature conservation in the country.

USSR State Agro-Industrial Committee
USSR State Committee for Science and Technology
USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control
USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources
USSR Academy of Sciences. Third quarter of 1987

VII. Legislation pertaining to social development and culture

30. Legislative instrument pertaining to the periodic certification of workers of soviet and social organization machinery, executives, and specialists of the national economy.

USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions
AUCCTU
Komsomol Central Committee
USSR Ministry of Justice
USSR State Committee for Science and Technology. 1986

31. USSR Council of Ministers decree on plural work.

USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions
AUCCTU
USSR Ministry of Justice
USSR Gosplan
USSR Ministry of Finance. Fourth quarter of 1986

32. Regulations governing disciplinary responsibility for the purpose of subordination.

USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions
USSR Ministry of Justice
USSR Academy of Sciences
AUCCTU. Latter half of 1986

33. Legislative instrument on the further stimulation of senior citizens' participation in social production.

USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions
USSR Gosplan
USSR Ministry of Finance. 1986

34. USSR law on the USSR State Archives.

USSR Main Archives Administration
USSR Ministry of Culture
USSR Academy of Sciences
USSR State Committee for Science and Technology
USSR Ministry of Justice. Fourth quarter of 1987

VIII. Legislation on other issues.

35. USSR law on USSR state security.

USSR Ministry of Justice
USSR KGB
USSR Ministry of Defense
USSR Prosecutor's Office
USSR MVD
USSR Academy of Sciences. 1990

36. USSR Council of Ministers decree on confirmation of the Regulations Governing the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations.

USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations
USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade
USSR Ministry of Justice
USSR Gosplan
USSR Gosstroy
USSR Ministry of Finance
USSR Foreign Trade Bank. Fourth quarter of 1986

37. USSR Customs Code (new version)

USSR Council of Ministers State Customs Control Main Administration
USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade
USSR Ministry of Justice
USSR Ministry of Finance
USSR MVD
USSR Supreme Court
USSR Prosecutor's Office
USSR KGB. Fourth quarter of 1987

38. USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree on execution of the findings of foreign courts.

USSR Ministry of Justice
USSR Supreme Court
USSR Prosecutor's Office
USSR Foreign Ministry. First half of 1988.

ARTICLE CITES INFANT MORTALITY FIGURES

PM291043 [Editorial Report] Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No. 43, October 1986 (signed to press 16 October 1986) carries on page 6 and 7 under the headline "Population of the USSR" a 1,000-word unattributed report on USSR population figures based on data supplied by the USSR Central Statistical Administration. The report includes the following table of "Births, Deaths, and Natural Growth of Population in the USSR":

	1970	1980	1983	1984	1985
			THOUSAND PERSONS		
Births	4,226	4,851	5,392	5,387	5,374
Deaths	1,996	2,744	2,823	2,965	2,947
Natural growth	2,230	2,107	2,569	2,422	2,427
infant deaths under the age of 1 year	103	132	134	140	140
			PER 1,000 INHABITANTS		
Births	17.4	18.3	19.8	19.6	19.4
Deaths	8.2	10.3	10.4	10.8	10.6
Natural growth	9.2	8.0	9.4	8.8	8.8
infant deaths under the age of 1 year	24.7	27.3	25.3	25.9	26.0

CHANGES IN FOREIGN TRADE METHODS DISCUSSED

PM261805 Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No. 42, Oct 86 (Signed to Press 9 Oct 86) p 20

[Article by Doctor of Economic Sciences V. Shastiko, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Economics of the World Socialist System Institute, under the rubric "Foreign Economic Ties": "Expansion of the Functions of Financial Autonomy" -- first paragraph is an EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA introduction]

[Text] The measures being taken in our country to improve foreign ecoomic activity are prompted by the urgent tasks which have been set for this sphere of the national economy in connection with the enhancement of its role in the acceleration of socioeconomic development.

It is well known that certain negative trends have started emerging in foreign economic ties recently, and the prevailing structure and forms of economic, and scientific, and technical cooperation have found themselves in conflict with the tasks of intensifying the national economy and accelerating scientific and technical progress. In many respects the resulting situation is the consequence of obsolete methods of management in foreign economic activity and lack of coordination between industry and foreign trade. Production associations and enterprises have found themselves virtually excluded from direct participation in foreign economic activity in the process of socialist economic integration.

Defects of Bureaucratic Administration [subhead]

Until quite recently the management system in the foreign economic sphere was based primarily on bureaucratic administrative methods, while methods of financial autonomy were virtually nonexistent in relations between industry and foreign trade, and enterprises lacked even the minimum of independence in the sphere of foreign economic cooperation.

Foreign trade asociations placed with enterprises detailed orders for deliveries of output for export. Enterprises were bound to deliver the appropriate output and, in the event of failure to meet the export order, were held strictly responsible and even subject to legal liability. If, on the other hand, the commodity was not sold on schedule, the enterprise was bound, under the regulations in force, to store it in its own warehouses and meet the costs of storage from its own funds until such time as it received instructions either to ship it abroad or to sell it through Gossnab organs inside the country. Export commodity accounts were calculated in domestic wholesale prices adjusted by supplements for export performance and deductions in respect of commission payments to the foreign trade association. The enterprise often did not know to which foreign consumer the commodity had been sold and at what price. The results of sales of its output on the foreign market had no effect at all on its economic interests. Foreign trade associations, in their turn, were not responsible at all to the enterprise for the sale of its output.

As practice showed, the inadequate interest of an export producer in the results of exports is difficult to overcome solely by means of the previously introduced special measures to encourage export production -- export supplements to the price of commodities produced for export and foreign currency allocation. After all, export out put usually represents a small proportion of an enterprise's total output program and, consequently, has little effect on the total size of material incentives.

Higher demand of export output, its packaging, transportation, service facilities, and claims for replacements -- all these outweigh the advantages offered to date by export incentives. Even the main incentive -- allocation of part of export earnings -- is only formal, becuase these allocations are usually utilized by superior organizations under centralized procedures, or their use by the entrerprise involves considerable difficulties, including some that are purely bureaucratic [chisto formalnogo poryadka]. For many enterprises, work for export is a matter of honor, but far too onerous.

Economic methods of management played almost no role at all in imports, either. In the majority of cases, the consumer of imported products does not know at what price or on what conditions imported commodities have been purchased for him: He was charged the domestic wholesale price for them. A significant proportion of the equipment coming in from capitalist countries is purchased by using bank or firm loans. The repayment of these loans and the interest charge on them have absolutely nothing to do with the consumer. On the other hand, the foreign trade organization cannot have any substantial effect on the use of the equipment it has purchased and in fact has little interest in it: The performance of its functions was completed when the consumer received the imported equipment. The foreign trade organization's economic situation was in no way affected if the imported equipment was not installed and commissioned and failed to produce any returns but, on the contrary, involved additional expenditure for its storage. For its part, an enterprise which failed to install equipment on schedule incurred no material responsibility if, for example, the foreign trade associations or the bank had already started repaying the loan or making interest payments, even though the equipment was still lying in warehouses.

Economic relations in foreign economic activity are now undergoing a fundamental change: The management system in this sphere is being made subject to exactly the same principles that are being currently introduced in the economic machinery for the management of the national economy -- there is an expansion of the rights and responsibility of associations and enterprises which are being transferred to complete financial autonomy and self-financing. These measures generate among producers of output an interest in expanding deliveries for export and making more efficient use of imported commodities.

In the next few years financial autonomy will have to play a substantial role in overcoming the isolation of domestic industrial associations and enterprises from foreign economic work.

There are two avenues for the application of financial autonomy to boost the efficiency of foreign economic work in the national economy. The first concerns the mutual relations between the domestic producer of export output on the one hand, and other enterprises, suppliers, supply organs, the sector ministry, and budget and other state and economic components inside the country on the other. The second avenue covers mutual relations between our exporters and importers and their counterparts abroad.

Equal Partners [subhead]

The elimination of weak links in relations between the foreign economic sphere and industry is possible when ties between them are established on the basis of financial autonomy, as between equal subjects of economic relations.

The measures being taken now envisage that 20 ministries and departments and 70 of the largest associations and enterprises are given the right to engage independently in foreign economic activity. The remaining economic organizations will perform the export and import of output not on the basis of detailed orders or commission orders as before, but on the basis of contractual relations with foreign trade associations under the Ministry of Foreign Trade and other ministries and departments. Economic contracts will determine the obligations of the parties and the conditions which will govern mutual relations between the partners in the sphere of production and deliveries of export output and in the purchase of import commodities.

The scope that is thus being given to financial autonomy in foreign economic activity will not be some kind of isolated phenomenon restricted only within the boundaries of our economy. It will be organically combined with similar processes in other CEMA countries. The improvement of industry's relations with the foreign economic sphere is today common for the majority of socialist communist countries and is being constantly enriched by each other's experience. A certain experience of this type has been accumulated in several European CEMA countries, and could be applied in our country subject to the specific features of the Soviet economy.

What is common in the experience of the USSR and the fraternal countries is the desire to establish a direct link between the national economic results of foreign economic activity and the financial autonomy interests of industrial enterprises and foreign trade organizations. The effect of this activity directly influences the shaping of incentive funds in an enterprise which is directly interested in achieving better results from the sale of its output to external markets, or in utilizing imported articles. There emerges a uniform system of enterprise and foreign trade organization interests.

The shaping of this unity of interests is furthered by the uniform financial results indicator of enterprises' activities in commodity deliveries to the external market and the domestic consumer, which is applied by the countries in different forms. This indicator comprises the sum total of earnings from activities in the external and domestic markets. The uniform financial results indicator helps to ensure that an enterprise shares directly in profits and bears responsibility for losses incurred in the sphere of foreign economic ties. Economic relations between industry and foreign trade are conducted on a direct basis rather than through the intermediary of the budget compensating for price fluctuations arising through differences in domestic and foreign trade prices.

The essence of this approach is that, when accounting for export and import output, the actual results have a direct impact on the financial autonomy interests of enterprises. A key role in this is played by the system of prices used by the enterprise to sell export output and purchase imports.

The enterprise accounts for deliveries at the prices at which the commodities were sold or purchased on the external market. Moreover, prices are converted in national currency using the relevant exchange rate or coefficient which generally reflects the real purchasing power of national currency in relation to the foreign currencies used to fix foreign trade prices.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of currency coefficients for determining the uniform financial results indicator, and for the comparison of all cost indicators of foreign economic relations without which it is impossible to introduce financial autonomy in this sphere of activity. But this is a far from simple matter. The complexity lies in the fact that the purchasing power of currencies differs from country to country not only because of each country's general economic condition, but also because of differences in the structure of trade with individual countries and substantial discrepencies between world and domestic prices.

Exchange rates, apart from their price formation function, also play a role as a kind of normative of the efficiency of foreign economic ties. When enterprises use this normative as a guideline they can take measures to reduce the cost of production, increase the profitability of their foreign economic activity, and improve the structure of exchanges. It is necessary to bear in mind the differences in the economic situation of individual enterprises and the different level of production profitability, given the level of foreign trade prices and currency exchange rates used in the country's foreign economic ties. With this is mind, state grants and subsidies are used in some cases. They are set for a given time period, during which measures must be taken to reach the required profitability level.

Financial Autonomy and Direct Ties [subhead]

It is well known that some Soviet production associations and enterprises are already engaging in direct economic, scientific, and technical interaction with their partners in fraternal countries. Financial autonomy for them acquires an international nature in the full sense of the word.

The principles and demands constituting the essence of financial autonomy relations -- self-financing, self-capitalization, and profitability -- must be rigorously observed also in international economic relations.

It is particularly important to observe such a principle as the recouping of expenditure from sales of output to the foreign partner. In international economic relations this principle can be implemented by means of achieving mutual advantage and equivalence in exchanges and profitability in foreign economic ties. The complexity of the practical implementation of these absolute conditions lies in the fact that some of the factors governing them operate independently of the participants in cooperation. These factors include, for example, the spontaneously changing dynamics of world prices. The same applies to international fluctuations in the exchange rates for currencies used in reciprocal accounting by CEMA partners and in converting world prices (expressed in capitalist currencies) to transfer rubles.

The problems of price formation and currency exchange rates, which ensure equivalence in exchanges and mutual advantage in cooperation, acquire key importance in international financial autonomy. The task appears to be [viditsya] to make flexible use of these instruments as applied to the goals of cooperation; by no means an easy task but attainable in the event that prices are set by the actual enterprise establishing foreign economic ties with a partner abroad.

Until now enterpriese lacked the right to set prices for foreign commodity exchanges. The commercial contract setting the economic conditions of the exchange used to be concluded by the foreign trade association on its own behalf.

Now it is envisaged to grant associations and enterprises establishing direct production sharing ties with partners abroad the right to conclude independently economic agreements and contracts for the delivery of commodities and the supply of services, and to coordinate prices and other conditions of economic cooperation.

The main demand as regards the export price which would provide the basis for effecting deliveries to the partner abroad is that it should, on the one hand, ensure the profitability of production for export and, on the other hand, provide an incentive for improving the quality of exported commodities and their competitiveness. As regards the price of imported commodities, it must not undermine the competitiveness of domestic market commodities of comparable quality -- it must not be higher [as published] than the domestic prices of similar commodities produced by domestic industry.

Hence the demands being made of the exchange rate of the Soviet ruble for foreign currencies in which the exchange is conducted: To ensure the hitherto lacking real comparablilty of foreign trade and domestic prices, and also of the currencies used in reciprocal accounting between partners.

The ensuring of currency self-financing and self-capitalization in international economic accounting presupposes that all currency expenditure incurred by an enterprise that has entered into business relations with a partner abroad is covered by its own funds which have been earned by it.

At the same time, new opportunities are now becoming available for associations and enterprises which are successful in their work -- they are given the right to take advantage of foreign currency loans from the USSR Foreign Trade Bank, but they are made responsible for the prompt repayment of borrowed funds and for interest payments from currency revenue earned from exports.

The introduction of financial autonomy in foreign economic activity is not a simple matter. Numerous methodological and economic questions have to be resolved. They include, for example, the setting of prices for export and import output, the elaboration of currency coefficients, and many others. Equal importance attaches to work with association and enterprise cadres for whom participation in foreign economic activity is something unknown and new. Much strenuous work lies ahead, demanding new approaches and restructuring the thinking of all workers, both in industry and in the foreign economic sphere.